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Political Islam has emerged as an unambiguous threat to liberal and 
Western-leaning regimes throughout the world.  Public discourse has focused on 
the Islamic nature of this challenge, emphasizing the cultural characteristics of 
the threat.  In contrast, this thesis argues that Political Islam is essentially a 
political challenge.  Further, states can and do dictate the political space 
available to Islamists.  In order to illustrate this argument, Indonesia and Algeria 
serve as case studies.  These two culturally, economically and ethnically diverse 
nations share a predominance of Muslim adherents.  Each nation has struggled 
with Political Islam.  Yet, the consequences of state policy have profoundly 
differed.  Recent innovations in political science theory are employed to provide a 
uniform structure of comparison between the two case studies.  The thesis 
concludes that states make a choice whether to play offense or defense against 
their political opposition.  When states choose the offensive, using targeted, 
preemptive repression to subsume the political space, they are successful.  
When states choose the defensive, using indiscriminate, reactive repression to 
foreclose political space, they are failures.  This thesis implies that states, far 
from being hapless victims of fervently religious movements, can exercise a 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE CONTEXT 
As America’s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) moves into its third year, 
our national foreign policy debate has struggled to find an insightful and broadly-
applicable analytical framework.  Such a framework is desperately needed.  For, 
if we are to understand the origins of Islamism and contain Islamist Terrorism, we 
must first analyze Islamism’s political context.  Public discourse has rarely moved 
past the initial attempt to answer two simple questions.  Who is attacking us and 
why were we attacked?  The inadequate answer proffered was, “They [terrorists 
inspired by Islamic Fundamentalism] hate our freedoms...”1  This sophomoric 
analytical framework, admittedly optimized for political effect and not intellectual 
content, ultimately leads to only two policy prescriptions:  change whatever 
terrorists hate about the West or eliminate everyone who hates the West.  The 
former, often labeled ‘appeasement’, is not considered to be a politically 
acceptable solution.  The latter course is complicated by two factors.  First, 
terrorist groups, not individual states, are assumed to be the proper target of the 
GWOT.2 That is, policy makers have assumed that states are the hapless victims 
or incompetent hosts of Islamic terrorist groups.  Second, these groups are 
identified by religious, not political labels (e.g. Islamic Fundamentalist, Muslim 
Radicals).  These labels imply that violent Islamic Fundamentalist movements 
are the product of religious creeds or teachings.  Such an implication can blind 
policy makers to the essentially political genesis of these organizations.  This 
essay will suggest that these violent Islamist organizations are the political 
product of the failed states they are located within.  That is, actors like Osama bin 
Laden exist and flourish because of the fabulously rich, corrupt and autocratic 
Saudi regime and the hospitality or ineptitude of Afghanistan’s Taliban.  Or, 
Hezbollah and Hamas have emerged from the bloody injustice and cynicism of 
the Israel/Palestine/Lebanon triangle.  To date, US policy has reflected these                                             




deep interactions by calling for military force to be applied within states 
(Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines) in order to destroy the violent Islamist 
groups they (allegedly) host.  Regimes have fallen but the force of Islamic 
Fundamentalism remains.  As yet, a causal relationship between ending bad 
regimes and ending terrorism does not appear to exist.  This should come as no 
surprise because flawed analysis produces flawed policy prescriptions.  Our 
national policy debate demands better. 
B. THE ARGUMENT 
Fortunately, refinements in the social sciences can offer better.  Recent 
efforts (Hafez 2003, Wickham 2002, Wiktorowicz 2003) have applied the 
analytical framework of social movement theory (SMT) to the contentious politics 
of Islamic Fundamentalists.  Others (Migdal 1997, Nasr 2001, VanCreveld 1999) 
have explored such contentious politics from the state’s perspective.  These 
efforts have demonstrated the insightful applicability of state level analysis and 
SMT to a field of study marked historically by the condescending 
oversimplification of Orientalism.  SMT attempts to answer not why but how 
Islamic social movements become rebellious.  Using SMT, one can also help to 
determine how social movements do not become rebellious.  In this context, the 
state level of analysis seeks to explain how regimes consolidate or diffuse power 
in the face of Islamist opposition.  An understanding of how such Islamist 
movements do or do not become rebellious informs a state’s efforts to counter 
the possibility of rebellion.  If international rebellious social movements like 
Islamic Fundamentalism are analogous to domestic rebellious social movements, 
then insights generated from this line of enquiry should significantly inform our 
larger GWOT policy debate.  That is, if SMT helps us to understand how a state 
can impact the rebelliousness of a domestic social movement, then we can infer 
strategies for how a global hegemony might impact an international terrorist 
movement.  Though critical to the credibility of any eventual conclusions, this 
thesis will not attempt to test the validity of this assumption.  Instead, this paper 
will simply acknowledge the assumption and focus on the analysis. 
3 
The underlying theme for this thesis is that the state determines the level 
of Islamization in Muslim societies.  States are not shapeless puppets moved 
whimsically by the strings of Islamists or any other social actor.  States, weak or 
strong, consciously decide on the role of Islam.  The theoretical framework for 
this argument is derived from Vali Nasr’s Islamic Leviathan.  He states matter-of-
factly that “the state has played a key role in embedding Islam in politics.”3  For 
the purposes of this paper, we also explore the corollary of Nasr’s thesis that the 
state has played a key role in not embedding Islam in politics.  By investigating 
Indonesia and Algeria, it will be shown that states do, in fact, matter.  These two 
states have both withstood pressure from the Islamists to make Islam the 
bedrock of their political system.  Although often faced with appeasing Muslim 
interests, the Indonesian and Algerian states determined whether or not a 
legitimate and successful Islamic political movement gained the reigns of national 
power and whether or not rebellion erupted.    
The assumption which Nasr disproves is the often widely accepted notion 
that “Islamization is the work of Islamist movements who have forced their 
ideology on ruling regimes and other hapless social actors.”4  In Nasr’s case 
studies, the Malaysian and Pakistani states achieved regime consolidation 
because they sought to use Islam to legitimize their rule.  In Indonesia and 
Algeria, we will argue that the states have consolidated power (often at a horrific 
price) because they never allowed Islam to become politically dominant. 
This is not to say that Islam is not a powerful force in Muslim societies.  
But it is to say that the Islamic faith alone is not enough for a majority-Muslim 
population to evolve into an Islamic state.  Politics in Islamic societies often 
resemble politics in Christian societies.  Conflicting societal institutions 
continually vie for influence.  The state will accommodate these institutions based 
on their relative influence within society. 
                                            
3 Nasr 2001: 4. 
4 Ibid: 3. 
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The usefulness of this paper will be to provide a better understanding of 
the state/social actor relationship in Islamic societies.  There is no cookie-cutter 
approach that can provide the definitive answer, but this paper suggests a 
generalized foundation upon which students of state governance can better 
explain the policies states follow.  State level analysis hopes to explain four main 
questions:  “Why do states Islamize?  When are they likely to do so?  Through 
what mechanisms and to what ends do they Islamize?  And what is likely to be 
the consequence of this turn to Islam?”5  This paper will examine another 
available strategy for states with Muslim societies.  Why don’t states Islamize?   
When are they not likely to do so?  How are they able to deter Islamization?  
What will be the consequences of shunning Islamization?  Indonesia and Algeria 
offer strong support that the state does matter in Islamic societies.  The state has 
options in plotting its political course. 
C. THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT 
It is important to note that this paper readily accepts the notion that the 
state can and will be shaped by societal influence.  But it will be shown that the 
emphasis must be placed on the state.  The state always has a choice in setting 
its political course.  Of course, if all citizens desire shariah, the state will have a 
difficult time maintaining its legitimacy without also moving in that direction.  This 
paper acknowledges the fact that states do not operate in a closed system, 
immune from society.  States use cultural leanings to their advantage.  Culture is 
a tool of the state.6  Hegemony and legitimacy are necessities of a strong state, 
and outside of the monopoly of force, controlling the “cultural underpinnings of 
their socio-political outlook” takes priority.7 
This paper hopes to debunk the argument that the role of religion is all-
powerful in Muslim societies.  By using Indonesia and Algeria as examples, an 
exception to the inevitability of Islamization in Muslim societies will be shown.  
The notion that Islamic society is somehow pre-destined to become part of an 
                                            
5 Ibid: 4. 
6 Ibid: 7. 
7 Ibid: 8. 
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Islamic state is not true.  The state’s leadership has the most important influence 
on that decision.  
In short, culture is obviously a key factor in influencing the state, but it is 
not the sole, determining factor.  The state determines the direction of the state.  
Obviously, it would be foolish for the state to pursue a policy insulting to the 
majority of the population.  But, the fact is, the leader of the state maintains that 
option, though he may soon find himself out of power.  Sukarno’s actions in 
shaping the Indonesian state provide an interesting example of trying to balance 
competing societal influences.  The Algerian attempt at political reform provides 
an example of a failed attempt at striking such a balance.  In each case, the 
Islamist position never gained the upper hand. 
D. THE STATE 
There is no shortage of literature on the importance and significance of the 
state.  For the purposes of our argument, this paper will employ a broad definition 
of the state.  In short, states “provide for education, defense, and health care, 
and account for economic development and social change.”8  States make 
policies, collect revenue, and, in short, greatly impact any number of the citizens’ 
lives.9  As a result of conducting these actions, the state defines itself and the 
extent of its political reach.  The state sets the framework upon which society will 
function.  Modern history has shown that the state is the most important factor in 
effecting social and political change.10  Those who control the levers of the state 
have an incredible tool at their disposal to dictate societal change.  Leaders of 
the state have the option of even operating counter to society’s desires.11  State 
leaders are the most crucial element in society’s evolution. 
Such leaders have several options from which to choose.  As the state 
pursues a particular policy, it is possible that legitimate change within society can 
occur.  If the particular policy is a spectacular failure, it is possible that the state 
                                            
8   Nasr 2001: 5. 
9   Trimberger 1978. 
10 Nordlinger 1987: 353-90. 
11 Geddes 1994: 1-2. 
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will no longer be legitimate.  States need to have control over the means of force, 
but “they must also control their subjects ideologically.”12  The ideological framing 
options available to the state are defined by the society’s culture. 
A state’s policy will inevitably draw on images and symbols of its particular 
culture.  States frame the culture and “its traditional icons, its metaphors, its 
heroes, its rituals and its narratives” to serve its political purposes.13  Whatever 
the state does, its must meet the approval of the masses for its legitimacy.  With 
legitimacy gained, the state can begin “redrawing social boundaries to coincide 
with actual or desired political borders… (and) states have been at the core of 
reinvention of society.”14  
In summary, the state and society are in constant flux.  Wide-ranging 
boundaries of acceptable behavior exist within a particular society.  From that 
range, the state can choose available options in its policy pursuit.  Once policy is 
implemented, the state becomes the shaper of society and culture.  If at any time 
the state gets too far off the mark or fails to re-shape the cultural boundaries, 
society will react and either replace the existing state or cause the state to re-
define its policies.  The state is in a constant dilemma of asserting power while at 
the same time providing the citizenry a sense of ownership within the state. 
E. POLITICAL ISLAM 
Religion has been the most powerful influence on culture.  Islam, in 
particular, has a deeply political aspect to it.  Combine the beliefs and politics of a 
religion and add in centuries-old repression at the hand of colonialists and it is 
easy to see why violent rebellion and theocracy are often associated with Islam.  
It is no wonder that a term like “Islamization” exists.  Islamism will be defined as a 
desire for the state to have a “greater visibility of Islamic norms, values, and 
symbols in the public arena, and (an) anchoring of law and policy making in 
values.”15  Islamism has been given a fertile environment in which to grow 
                                            
12 Ibid: 7. 
13 Ibid: 7. 
14 Migdal 1997: 230. 
15Nasr 2001: 3. 
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because of the colonial repressions of the past.  The Algerian Islamist leader Ali 
Belhadj explained it this way: “My father and brothers (in religion) may have 
physically expelled the oppressor France from Algeria, but my struggle, together 
with my brothers, using weapons of faith, is to banish France intellectually and 
ideologically and to be done with her supporters who drank her poisonous 
milk.”16 
F. THE TOOL 
Before we can begin an analysis of our case studies, we need an 
introduction to the framework for our examination.  The evolution of Indonesian 
Islamism will be explored from the perspective of a state-level analysis as 
described above.  The broad, narrative perspective is intended to reveal equally 
broad strategic insights.  By contrast, Algerian Islamism will be explored using 
SMT.  This narrow analytical perspective is intended to reveal detailed tactical 
insights.  The Algerian case became rebellious; the Indonesian did not.  The 
disparate perspectives are designed to highlight any common insights.  That is, 
themes which emerge from such different analytical approaches are more robust 
than from similar case studies. 
The chronology of the Algerian movement’s interaction with the state will 
be assessed through five variables:  the framing of grievances, political access, 
timing of state repression, targeting of state repression and the emergence of 
hyper-violent, exclusive organizations.  Rebellious social movements do not 
evolve in a vacuum.  They are the product of political environments that dictate 
opportunities and boundaries for action.  These ‘rules of the game’ provide the 
calculus for movement actors’ decisions regarding strategy and action.17  The 
first variable of this larger political environment is the manner in which a social 
movement elects to articulate, or ‘frame’, its grievances with the state.  Framing 
can, at first glance, appear as little more than slogan coining or bumper-sticker 
production.  However, politically effective framing ties simple or popular images 
to larger agendas.  Framing is the act of seizing rhetorical ground and turning it 
                                            
16Ibid: 13. 
17 McAdam et al. 1996. 
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to a purpose.  For example, colonial Americans rallied to the cry of “no taxation 
without representation”.  This frame tied the popular resentment towards taxes to 
the Crown together with an implication that the colonial’s were not being treated 
as the equals to other British subjects.  The resulting image provided a populist 
cover to those who simply were engaging in self-interested, bare-knuckle politics.  
More recently, Hamas has deftly claimed Palestine as a waqf or religious 
endowment.  The result is not simply to tie Palestine to the notion of a God-given 
charity for the benefit of all Muslims.  The deeper result is to politically restrict 
other Muslim’s ability to even discuss the possibility of a settlement which leaves 
portion of the waqf in non-Muslim hands.  States and rebellious movements alike 
can and do seize the opportunity to frame their agendas.18  Such framing is 
necessary, but not sufficient for social movements to become rebellious.19 
The second variable of a movement’s tendency to rebellion is the degree 
to which a social movement can access the political system.  The ability of social 
movements to participate in the political organism of their state, directly impacts 
the movement’s decision to promote reform or revolution.20  As the iconic Che 
Guevara warned, revolutionaries should avoid armed rebellion in states that 
maintain some electoral legitimacy because, “the populace will not turn in a 
revolutionary direction while electoral alternatives remain an option and retain 
appeal”.21  That is why, the more accessible the system, the more likely Islamists 
will embrace accommodative strategies instead of violence. 
The third and fourth variables of the state’s political environment involve 
the character of state repression.  Repression and access are intimately 
intertwined.  As Social Science has noted, state repression “raises the 
contender’s cost of collective action.”22  Yet, repression has produced a variety of 
outcomes from provoking further rebellion to quelling rebellion.  The best 
                                            
18 Robinson 2003: 130. 
19 Wiktotowicz 2003: 25. 
20 Hafez 2003: 27. 
21 McClintock 1998: 5. 
22 McAdam, et al 1997: 100. 
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discriminates for differentiating these two outcomes are the timing and targeting 
of state repression.23 
The timing of repression can be characterized in one of two ways:  
preemptive or reactive.  Repression can be considered preemptive if it is applied 
before the prospective rebels have been able to organize themselves and 
mobilize followers.  Preemptive repression increases the uncertainty and cost of 
organizing and acting.  Prospective sympathizers are unsure of the size and 
commitment of the organization.  “Recruitment is less risky when the recruiter 
can trust the recruit, and vice versa.”24  Preemptive repression deprives a 
movement of repeated opportunities for interaction with prospective recruits.  
Such repression discourages rebellion because it decreases a movement’s 
ability to expand its organizational and material resources.  By contrast, reactive 
repression increases a movement’s established grievances and inspires a call for 
change through action.  If such repression is severe enough to threaten a 
movement’s very survival, the movement is motivated to act to preserve its 
accumulated resources.  “Where no movement gains have been made due to 
preemptive repression, retreat, not rebellion, is the likely outcome.”25 
Targeting refers to the breadth of actors that are impacted by the state’s 
repression.  The intent here is to discern whether the state focuses its efforts 
specifically on a movement’s leadership and central membership or more broadly 
toward movement sympathizers and innocent suspects.  Selective repression 
clearly demonstrates a state’s intention to punish only “troublemakers” thereby 
encouraging sympathizers to keep their distance.26  On the other hand, 
indiscriminate repression makes the cost of action uniform for “troublemakers”, 
sympathizers and bystanders alike.  Such repression antagonizes individuals into 
committing acts for which, they believe, punishment is inevitable.  In the face of 
political exclusion these two variables are necessary and sufficient to explain 
                                            
23 Hafez 2003: 72. 
24 Della Porta 1988: 159. 
25 Hafez: 75. 
26 Ibid: 75. 
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rebellion.27  That is, “armed insurgencies result from the violent suppression of 
the peaceful political activities of aggrieved people who have the capacity and 
opportunity to rebel”.28 
Finally, we must discriminate between armed rebellion against bona fide 
state targets and intentional anti-civilian violence.  This distinction will help us 
separate the murky area between guerilla warrior and terrorist.  Our ultimate aim 
is a better understanding of Islamist as terrorist.  Therefore, we identify exclusive 
organizations as the fifth variable in the state’s relationship with Islamic 
Fundamentalism.  An inclusive organization allows relatively unrestricted criteria 
for membership.  By contrast, an exclusive organization sets rather demanding 
standards for membership.  Such exclusive organizations are the result of 
protracted conflicts.  This is due to three factors.  First, state agents that infiltrate 
rebellious movements will tend to destroy them from within.  Exclusive and 
loosely structured organizations deter and delay such infiltration.  Second, direct 
set-backs dealt by the state (arrest, execution, exile) can eliminate a centralized 
movement where such actions are non-lethal to a decentralized organization.  
Finally, terrorist activities in a repressive system require a great deal of 
coordination and trust.  The need to maintain secrecy is absolute.  The 
significance of each point grows with the duration of the conflict. 
G. THE ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I sets the stage for our thesis.  We have introduced two very 
different, yet complimentary theoretical approaches to the investigation of 
state/Islamist interaction.  Chapter II will introduce the reader to the key political 
forces in modern Indonesia and Algeria.  Following this introduction, Chapters III 
will embark on a rich, state level exploration of Indonesian political life.  This 
exploration will remain attentive to the descriptive power of SMT.  In contrast, 
Chapter IV will provide a parsimonious analysis of modern Algeria’s Islamic 
social movement while it incorporates the state’s experience with contentious 
Islamic politics.  Finally, Chapter V will conclude the analysis, synthesize the 
                                            
27 Ibid: 72. 
28 Goodwin 2001: 37. 
11 
common lessons of these two analytical perspectives and suggest policy 
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II. THE PLAYERS 
A. INDONESIA 
This chapter will introduce the major cultural and societal players and 
factors with which the state sought to exert control.  During the covered time 
period – the end of the colonial era until the fall of Suharto – it is possible to 
narrow the key participants to a manageable scholarly discussion.  Indonesia’s 
two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, are the only two individuals who have had 
the ability to manipulate the official levers of the state.  These levers can also be 
simplified into four main areas: the Islamists, the Communists, the Army, and the 
constitutions, or Pancasila.  For the purposes of this paper, Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) will represent the Islamists.  The justification for this approach is to narrow 
the focus.  NU was and is Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization and has been 
the single most politically active Islamic group.  NU provides an excellent 
example of how the state shapes Islamist political players. 
1. Ahmad Sukarno 
Sukarno was, arguably, the most important figure in the history of the 
Indonesian state.  He can be credited with inventing a state that is intact even 
today.  Although his tenure was defined by a state constantly facing turmoil, even 
after his demise, his original vision for the Indonesian state remained unscathed.  
As the “Father of Indonesia,” Sukarno is credited with inventing Pancasila, the 
state philosophy that even his successor, Suharto, found necessary to leave 
intact.  Sukarno faced many difficult challenges to his authority and eventually fell 
to Suharto, but the Pancasila state survived. 
The first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, was born in 1901 in Surabaya to 
a Javanese school teacher father and Balinese mother.  He began school under 
his father’s tutelage and then moved on to receive elementary and secondary 
education under the Dutch system.  During this time, he boarded at the house of 
Umar Said Cokroaminoto, the leader of the large Islamic nationalist movement 
Sarikat Islam.  It was through him that Sukarno had his first widespread exposure 
to many of the time’s nationalist leaders.  Following his completion of secondary 
14 
school, Sukarno chose to remain in Indonesia to further pursue his studies and 
enrolled at the Bandung Techinical College.  It was here that he began to form 
his nationalist ideology, illustrated in his published article, “Nationalism, Islam, 
and Marxism.”  He understood the need to form a national ideology that could 
unite the several differing views among Indonesian society.  In 1927 he formed 
the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI).  The party’s foundation was “multiethnic 
nationalism, not religion or ethno-nationalism.”29  Sukarno was not anti-Islam, but 
he embraced a belief, influenced by the reforms in Turkey, that Islam should not 
be part of the state, and that only by separating the two could the Muslim world 
advance from its current stagnation.30  For Indonesia to compete against and the 
West it needed to modernize, and this, he believed, was only possible in a 
secular state.   
The failure of both the Sarikat Islam and Communist movements during 
the 1920’s left PNI as leader of nationalist sentiment.  Sukarno presented a 
message of secular nationalism that became extremely popular, as evidence by 
the huge crowds he drew during his speeches.  The reason for the crowds had 
as much to do with his message as with his notable public speaking ability.  His 
success in achieving a following led to the Dutch incarcerating him from 1929 
until 1931.  After release from jail, Sukarno agreed to refrain from political 
activity, but the Dutch in 1933 exiled him anyway.  The Dutch, in effect, granted 
Sukarno martyrdom status and placed Sukarno in prime position as a symbol of 
the Indonesian struggle for independence.   
Hoping to quell social unrest, the Japanese in 1942 allowed Sukarno to 
return.  Sukarno became a participant in the Japanese government and gained 
access to such organizational tools as the media.  Sukarno’s messages over the 
radio further increased his popularity.  As the Japanese sensed their eventual 
defeat in World War II, they allowed Sukarno to call a meeting of the major 
societal institutions in 1945 to form a plan for eventual independent Indonesian 
nationhood.  During this meeting the Indonesian Pancasila philosophy was born, 
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which provided a unifying message for Indonesians.  Sukarno was seen as the 
one who could turn this message into reality.  In 1945, he further enamored 
himself with the public with his agreement to limit his presidential power by 
agreeing to a parliamentary system.  Although this move lessoned presidential 
power, it gave Sukarno the ability to act independently and better represent 
himself as a “symbol of unity” against the Dutch and better serve as mediator 
between the conflicting interests of the blossoming nation.31  On 17 August 1945, 
two days after the official surrender of the Japanese in World War II, he took the 
first step toward a sovereign Indonesia and declared independence.  After a four-
year conflict/negotiation with the Dutch, Indonesia officially achieved nationhood 
in 1949.   
Sukarno understood the political climate as well as anyone.  He was the 
single most powerful political figure and was the only one who could at least 
superficially unify Indonesians.  With his reformist philosophy, Sukarno, “in a 
remarkable display of political agility,” was able to lead Indonesia to 
independence and hold its presidency until Suharto officially replaced him in 
1968.32   And even after his departure, the Indonesian Pancasila state survived.  
The basic premise of Pancasila is still the foundation upon which today’s 
emerging Indonesian democracy bases its reforms.  The diversity of Indonesian 
society required a flexible constitution and Sukarno gave it one.   
2. Suharto 
If Sukarno was the inventor of the Indonesian state, then Suharto was the 
consolidator of the Indonesian state.  Suharto was a repressive dictator, at least 
viewed through Western, pluralistic eyes.  He was heavy-handed at times, rigged 
the political system to remain in power, and was not hesitant to use military might 
against his own citizens.  But through his tenure he achieved what Sukarno could 
not- he consolidated the Indonesian state.  He took the Sukarno invention of 
Pancasila and aggressively pursued state policies of unity and modernization.  
He made up for his lack of faith in democracy with an ability to instill nationalistic 
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pride.  Although he was unable to overcome the financial crisis of 1997, he was 
responsible for stabilizing a state that is still around today.  His insistence on the 
Pancasila philosophy ensured that it remained the foundation of the state.  Even 
today, democratic reforms are conducted under the Pancasila framework. 
The second president of Indonesia, Suharto, was born in 1921 to the son 
of a minor village official in central Java.  Early in his life he had chosen the path 
of the military.  In 1940 he received military training under the Dutch and became 
a battalion commander under the Japanese Self Defense Corps.  As Indonesia 
moved toward its struggle against the Dutch and eventual independence, 
Suharto in 1945 entered the Indonesian revolutionary army.  It was through his 
fight against the Dutch that Suharto began to feel slighted as leader of the 
revolution.  Many members of the armed forces felt it was them, not the Dutch-
educated elite like Sukarno, who were the real leaders of the revolution.   
Suharto, though, did not let his distaste for the elite prohibit his career 
from moving forward.  He moved up through the ranks, serving as Military 
Commander of Central Java in 1956.  By 1960 he had achieved the rank of 
Brigadier General.  In 1962 he became a Major General and served as Deputy 
Chief of Staff of the Army for East Indonesia Inter Regional Command, where he 
again fought the Dutch during their last-ditch effort to hold onto West Irian.  In 
1963, he became Commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), a 
position he held during the 1965 “coup.”33  
The botched “coup” of 1965 can also be viewed as a successful “coup” for 
Suharto because, in the end, it was he who came out on top.  He was able to 
effectively consolidate the armed forces under his control and overcome 
Sukarno’s vast influence.  By 1968 he had become the official president of 
Indonesia and held that post until his overthrow in 1998.  But even in his 
absence, the Indonesian state still adheres to same philosophy as Suharto: 
Pancasila.  Obviously, the undergoing democratic reforms require a different 
interpretation of Pancasila, but the basic tenants remain unchanged. 
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3. The Islamists – Nahdlatul Ulama 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has a membership of forty million and is the largest 
Muslim organization in Indonesia, a nation with the world’s largest Muslim 
population.  Its influence is not often discussed, but it is a shining example of a 
fundamentalist Islamic organization embracing democratic, pluralistic values.  NU 
has not necessarily always been consistent with these values, but its evolution 
provides an interesting case study of a civil institution operating within civil 
society.  Although still labeled as a “traditionalist” organization, NU’s focus has 
shifted from one pursuing the Islamization of Indonesian society to one pursuing 
the democratization of Indonesian society.  NU offers a unique insight into the 
inner workings of Muslim organizations.  Too many references are generically 
applied to Muslim groups that muddy the complexities of their members and the 
adaptability they have in adapting to a changing world.  NU is living proof that 
Islam is not inherently incapable of embracing plurality. 
NU rebukes stereotypical labels.  For instance, how can NU concurrently 
both embrace “traditional” and “progressive” philosophies?  Islamic traditionalists 
are expected to act in a particular manner.  Abdurrahman Wahid explained: 
Traditionalists are widely supposed to be rather backward in 
orientation and ossified in their understanding of Islamic society 
and thought…..(their) upholding of Islamic law leads them to reject 
modernity….(they) have a fatalistic understanding of submission to 
God’s will and a disregard for the exercise of free-will and 
independent thinking….(they forsake) the present world in the hope 
of gaining eternal happiness in heaven….they are a wholly passive 
community unable to cope with the dynamic challenges of 
modernisation…34 
It is the above misrepresentation of the complexity of fundamentalist 
Islamic thought that prevents a proper understanding of Islamization movements 
in general.  NU provides an excellent example regarding the adaptability of Islam 
in the political and social arenas 
NU has evolved a great deal throughout its history.  The stereotypical 
“traditionalist” label does not help to explain how NU came to embrace women’s 
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rights or how NU adapted to modern issues such as family planning, birth control, 
and banking.  The traditionalist label also does not help to explain how NU came 
to embrace Pancasila and not Islam as the foundation for the Indonesian state.35  
NU has continually adapted during its history; it has evolved from a belief in 
Islamism to a belief in plurality for all people, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  By 
examining the NU/state interactions, one finds a case where Islamic 
fundamentalism and democracy go hand-in-hand.  This paper will explore the NU 
evolution; the organization has, in general, operated in three eras: one as a 
socio-religious organization, one as an official political party, and again one as a 
socio-religious organization.36  Through the exploration of these eras, the 
traditionalist NU will be shown to be much more than its generic label suggests. 
In broad terms Indonesian Muslims are predominantly Sunni and can be 
separated into two groups: the syncretic abangan and the more orthodox santri 
Muslims. In general, santri Muslims include Islam as part of the political 
discussion whereas abangan Muslims often choose the more secular political 
parties.37   Abangan Muslims turned away from an orthodox view of Islam and 
turned “to socialism, secular nationalism, and Marxism to make sense of their 
new world.”38  Within the santri group, “modernist” and “traditionalist” Muslims 
exist and display different theological tendencies.  Although impossible to exactly 
categorize each group, a few distinct differences are noticeable.  First, a 
“modernist” tends to believe more in self-determination, whereas a “traditionalist” 
tends to believe more in God’s will.  Second, a “modernist” turns to a more literal 
interpretation of the Koran and the Hadiths for questions of faith.  A “traditionalist” 
leans more toward a scholarly interpretation that includes an historical context.39  
An example of a “modernist” group is Indonesia’s second-largest Muslim 
organization, Muhammadiyah.  Nahdlatul Ulama falls into the “traditionalist” 
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category.  Ironically, NU in its desire to remain true to its traditional values has 
pursued a politically progressive strategy.40   
NU was formally founded on January 31, 1926 by a group of prominent 
ulama (Muslim authorities) intent on giving an “organizational voice to the 
interests of traditional Islam.”41   Its primary function was to care for its umat 
(community).  Initially, the ulama leaders focused their efforts on education and 
social welfare through Islamic boarding schools, called pesantren, and 
assistance to Muslim peasants and farmers.  NU found a substantial following.  
Membership rose from forty thousand in 1933 to one hundred thousand in 
1938.42  In its expanding effort to care for the Muslim community, NU began to 
use the political arena to enhance its efforts to care for the umat.  Beginning in 
the late 1930’s, NU campaigned against colonial policies seen as contrary to 
Islamic life and supported the formation of GAPI, the Indonesian Political 
Organization, which was calling for the establishment of an Indonesian 
parliament in 1939.  The Japanese actively sought to use Islamic groups to assist 
in maintaining social calm.  They created the Department of Religious Affairs, 
staffed by members primarily from the Muslim community, and allowed for the 
formation of an Islamic political unity, Masyumi.  NU featured prominently in both 
of these ventures.43 
Decades prior to Indonesian independence, Islamic groups sought to unite 
Indonesians around religion.  Sarikat Islam was a movement begun in 1912 to 
speak for the voice of the Muslim people, and especially for Muslim merchants 
against its Chinese competitors.44  This movement, though, failed as its 
members were split ideologically between Muslim politics, secular nationalism, 
and Marxism.  Indonesia was a diverse and complex society.  People identified 
themselves as Muslims, but also as fathers, peasants, educated elite or any 
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other number of groups.  A Muslim bureaucrat living in Jakarta did not hold the 
same ideology as a peasant farmer living in rural Java.  One brand of Islam for all 
Indonesians proved difficult to formulate.  NU represented this complexity of this 
Indonesian society.  The traditionalist NU continually debated the philosophical 
direction upon which it should embark.  By 1984, the fundamentalist Islamic 
group had officially declared an interesting position; NU wholeheartedly 
embraced the state philosophy of Pancasila.  The fundamentalist NU was to 
become one of the most important catalysts for democratic reform in Indonesia. 
4. The Communists 
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), which became the voice of Indonesian 
Communism, was founded in founded in 1914 by Dutchman H.J.F.M. Sneevliet, 
and, ironically, was an offshoot of Sarikat Islam, one of the original Islamic 
movements seeking to unify the Muslim voice.45  Although PKI sought ties with 
Moscow and Lenin believed in supporting Asian nationalist revolutionary 
movements, the Comintern disagreed and passed a resolution opposing any 
pan-Muslim or pan-Asian revolutions.  The decision brought the idea of religion 
and Communism to the forefront in Indonesia, and by 1923, PKI had officially 
declared that it was “neutral” with regard to religion, a fact not lost on Islamist 
groups like NU.46 
The first substantial Communist movement was destroyed by colonialists 
during the failed rebellion of 1926-27, but the Communist cause did not 
disappear.  It is interesting to note where the PKI gained its support.  After all, 
Indonesia is upwards of 90% Muslim.  PKI appealed to the abangan Muslims in a 
way that can be viewed as mutual compromise.  The abangan Muslims sought a 
partner in its struggle against “the inroads of both activist Islam and urban-
sponsored ‘modernization’.”  The PKI, on the other hand needed to increase its 
following from the traditional disadvantaged, the “urban workers and lowly state 
functionaries, estate laborers, squatters on estate lands, and the young people in 
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the more detraditionalized villages.”47  The two ideologically different institutions 
became partners out of convenience and necessity. 
Early PKI was unsuccessful due to overly “dogmatic” ties Moscow.  A 
strictly anti-religious form of Communism just would not be successful in Muslim 
Indonesia.  The PKI became a force because it was “fervently patriotic, 
sympathetic to religion, peaceful in pursuit of its goals, painstakingly solicitous of 
the small problems consciously felt by its supporters, moderate in demands and 
self-effacing in the friendliness shown toward most other Indonesian political 
forces.”48  Much of this success can be attributed to its new leader, Aidit, who 
seemed to be offering a little bit for everyone except those at the other end of the 
ideological extreme, such as the army and the radical Islamists. 
5. The Army 
The army as an institution is much harder to define ideologically.  Some 
were Islamists and some were Communists, but on the whole, those in the army 
were a right-leaning group who opposed Sukarno, especially as he moved 
toward the left.  The Indonesian armed forces, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia, changed its name to TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia in 
1999), began as part of the colonial forces.  With the rapid surrender of the 
Japanese in 1945, the ABRI seized the opportunity to lead Indonesia to 
independence.  For the most part, the army did not have much in common with 
the educated elite like Sukarno.  Harold Crouch explained: 
The government leaders, who had joined the nationalist movement 
during the 1920’s and 1930’s, were derived mainly from the urban, 
Dutch-educated elite, whereas the senior officers of the army were 
rarely more than thirty years old and usually came from the small 
towns of Java, where they had been steeped in traditional culture, 
obtained only secondary schooling, and learned little Dutch.49 
The army’s ideology can more easily be defined by what it was not.  The 
majority of the army was not part of the elite, or the Communists, or the Islamists.  
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The army was a nationalist organization determined to have a hand in political 
affairs.  As the fight for independence began, there was a deep split.  It was the 
uneducated masses who fought the Dutch, while the educated elite, like 
Sukarno, appeared to appease the Dutch through negotiations.  It was a bitter 
divide that had tremendous impact on future society. 
The army had demonstrated a history of direct involvement within society, 
a fact that left it well-positioned for political and societal influence.  The army was 
a social force to be reckoned with.  With at least some semblance of a 
bureaucratic structure in place and with its at least partial control of its own 
monopoly of force, the Indonesian military was in prime position to influence 
Indonesian politics.  The military felt just as entitled to determine Indonesia’s 
future as the civilian leadership.  To the military this meant no compromise with 
the returning Dutch.  This aggressive stance required more forces than the 
35000 Japanese-trained nucleus, and so recruitment became necessary.50  As 
the military’s numbers increased, centralized control became more and more 
difficult.  Often, this recruitment might be to enlist an entire regional, radical youth 
organization.  These organizations would fight for the national army, but they still 
had local loyalties as well.51  This regional, paramilitary ancestry and its effects 
are still felt today in Indonesia.  As the only group with at least partial control of 
the country’s means of violence and a desire to involve itself politically, the 
military early on set itself up for its future dual function, dwifungsi, role. 
6. Pancasila 
Pancasila was Sukarno’s philosophical revolutionary foundation and was 
introduced during a Japanese-sponsored conference of various Indonesian 
societal groups in March 1945.  It was intended to provide the ideological 
legitimacy required for Indonesia to eventually achieve sovereignty and remains 
the basis for the Indonesian state today.  The term Pancasila literally means “five 
pillars.”  These five pillars were a belief in the following: nationalism, 
humanitarianism, representative government, social justice, and the belief in one 
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God.  The last pillar was the most socially divisive.  There existed a strong push 
among the Muslim community for an Islamic state and a great fear of repression 
by the non-Muslim minority if an Islamic state became a reality.  Originally, the 
principle was stated simply as “belief in God.”  Unsatisfactory to many Muslim 
leaders, the constitution committee agreed to change the principle to “belief in 
God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law,” known to 
this day as the Jakarta Charter.52  Not surprisingly, the non-Muslims and 
secularists disagreed with this choice and the added Islamic emphasis.  Sukarno 
and his second-in-command, Mohammad Hatta, needed to find a compromise.  
Nahdlatul Ulama gave them one.  NU suggested that a compromise between the 
two versions was to state the first principle as “belief in a singular God.”53  
Though far from perfect for either group, it was a workable agreement, and it 
gave the emerging nation at least a loose framework with which to proceed. 
The Pancasila debate exemplified the complexities of Indonesian culture.  
Although the five pillars were often criticized as too vague for an ideological 
foundation, Pancasila through the years remained as a constitutional foundation.  
Pancasila came to represent the epitome of compromise for conflicting 
ideological institutions.  Pancasila, in fact, eventually became one of the few 
concepts within Indonesian society that was beyond reproach.  Suharto had 
much to do with the Pancasila emphasis, but the fact was that the concept was 
pliable enough to appeal to any group.  The constitution remained flexible for 
both secular dictators like Suharto and Islamist groups like NU.  Both found much 
to be selfishly exploited within the philosophy of the five pillars.  Pancasila is the 
common thread of the Indonesian state.  Sukarno invented it, and Suharto 
strengthened it.  And today, democratic reform is based upon it.  Figure one 
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THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PANCASILA 
 
1. One and Only God 
• This principle of Pancasila reaffirms the Indonesian people's belief that God does exist. It also 
implies that the Indonesian people believe in life after death. It emphasizes that the pursuit of 
sacred values will lead the people to a better life in the hereafter. 
• The principle is embodied in article 29, Section I of the 1945 Constitution and reads: "The state 
shall be based on the belief in the One and Only God". 
2. Just and Civilized Humanity 
• This principle requires that human beings be treated with due regard to their dignity as God's 
creatures. It emphasizes that the Indonesian people do not tolerate physical or spiritual oppression 
of human beings by their own people or by any other nation. 
3. The Unity of Indonesia 
• This principle embodies the concept of nationalism, of love for one's nation and motherland. It 
envisages the need to always foster national unity and integrity. Pancasila nationalism demands 
that Indonesians avoid feelings of superiority on ethnical grounds, for reasons of ancestry and color 
of the skin. In 1928 Indonesian youth pledged to have one country, one nation and one language, 
while the Indonesian coat of arms enshrines the symbol of "Honea Tunggal lka" which means "unity 
in diversity". 
4. Democracy Guided by the Inner Wisdom in the Unanimity Arising Out of Deliberations 
Amongst Representatives 
• Pancasila democracy calls for decision-making through deliberations, or musyawarah, to reach a 
consensus, or mufakat. It is democracy that lives up to the principles of Pancasila. This implies that 
democratic right must always be exercised with a deep sense of responsibility to God Almighty 
according to one's own conviction and religious belief, with respect for humanitarian values of 
man's dignity and integrity, and with a view to preserving and strengthening national unity and the 
pursuit of social justice. 
• Thus, Pancasila Democracy means democracy based on the people's sovereignty which is inspired 
by and integrated with other principles of Pancasila. This means that the use of democratic rights 
should always be in line with responsibility towards God Almighty according to the respective faith; 
uphold human values in line with human dignity; guarantee and strengthen national unity: and be 
aimed at realizing social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia. 
5. Social Justice for the Whole of the People of Indonesia 
• This principle calls for the equitable spread of welfare to the entire population, not in a static but in 
a dynamic and progressive way. This means that all the country's natural resources and the 
national potentials should be utilized for the greatest possible good and happiness of the people. 
• Social justice implies protection of the weak. But protection should not deny them work. On the 
contrary, they should work according to their abilities and fields of activity. Protection should 
prevent willful treatment by the strong and ensure the rule of justice. 
• These are the sacred values of Pancasila which, as a cultural principle, should always be 
respected by every Indonesian because it is now the ideology of the state and the life philosophy of 
the Indonesian people. 








In 1947, after more than one hundred years of foreign rule, the native 
Algerian and Berber population sensed the grip of French colonialism loosening.  
The Algerian Organic Statute of that year established the first elected assembly 
in Algeria’s history.  Soon, with the success of Nasser’s nationalist revolution in 
Egypt and French withdrawal from Indo-China, Tunisia and Morocco, this first 
taste of national autonomy had blossomed into a popular independence 
movement, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN).  Indicative of its times, this 
first Algerian Rebellion eschewed religious or ethnic frames in favor of socialist 
and nationalist rhetoric.  After six years, 500,000 casualties and the demise of a 
French Republic, the Algerian nationalists had their independence. 
Algeria’s first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, took his regime on a brief, 
autocratic digression to the cult of personality.  In 1965, his tenure was cut short 
by a bloodless military coup.  The coup leader and long-time FLN stalwart, Houri 
Boumedienne, commanded the most significant elements of the Algerian armed 
forces.  As Boumedienne proceeded to consolidate his regime, Algeria finally 
began to reap the benefit of its vast natural resources.  Gradually, the army 
supplanted the FLN as the nation’s dominant political force.  Boumedienne 
gathered his closest civilian associates and the chief military commanders in a 
Council of the Revolution.  Collegial rule was in and factionalism was out.  
Nonetheless, with Boumedienne holding the offices of prime minister, president 
and minister of defense, Algeria remained decidedly autocratic. 
The FLN, though ardently nationalist, represented a larger coalition of anti-
colonial interests.  Chief amongst these was the al Qiyam Society.  This 
transnational Islamic organization reflected the Janus-like perspectives of its 
chief modern-day spokesmen:  Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj.54 
Despite a thin veil of Islam (including a constitutional reference to Islam as 
the state religion), Boumedienne embraced a program of socialist state building.  
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The emigrating settlers left behind vast landholdings that the state swiftly 
nationalized.  This policy soon extended to industry with a focus on developing 
the nation’s petroleum sector.  By 1971, Boumedienne managed to nationalize 
the formerly French-controlled oil fields.  This critical achievement coincided with 
a redistribution of state land to peasant collective farms.  While national petro-
wealth grew, farm productivity did not.  In addition, Boumedienne attempted to 
engage the power of nationalism by promoting Arabic culture and language.  This 
well-intentioned attempt to eradicate the vestiges of French colonialism produced 
the unintended consequence of alienating the large native Berber population.55  
The Berbers had grown accustomed to the uniform subjugation of Berber and 
Arab culture to the Francophone colonial culture.  The official state promotion of 
Arabic promised to deny the Berbers the full rewards of independence. 
By 1976, despite these challenges, Algeria appeared to have struck out on 
a successful path to national consolidation.  Soaring oil prices filled the national 
coffers.  A national charter and constitution were adopted and Boumedienne was 
legally elected president.  Even Boumedienne’s sudden death due to illness 
passed quietly as the army selected Chadli Bendjedid to be Algeria’s next 
president.  After a brief period of consolidation, Bendjedid moved to put his 
personal stamp on national rule.  As part of his policy to ease some of 
Boumedienne’s strict political controls, Bendjedid pardoned former president Ben 
Bella and released him from house arrest.  Bendjedid also moved to liberalize the 
national economy.  These reforms extended to privatizing the unsuccessful 
peasant cooperative farms.  By 1984, Bendjedid had been reelected in an 
unopposed national ballot. 
Algeria’s period of measured national consolidation was drawing to a 
close.  Soaring oil prices had engendered a national population explosion.  The 
youth, in particular, flocked to the cities to benefit from the oil-driven rentier social 
contract:  free education, free health care, government jobs.  As oil prices 
plummeted in the mid-1980s the state’s capacity to maintain this social contract 
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evaporated.  By late 1988, young protestors were clashing with police and 
soldiers throughout the country.  Bendjedid followed a program of severe 
repression with political and economic reforms.  He was reelected to a third term 
in December of 1988.  Falsely buoyed by this hollow mandate, Bendjedid revised 
the constitution in February 1989 in order to lay the groundwork for a July 
legalization of multiparty national elections.  One of the first parties to organize 
under the new system was an Islamist coalition, the Front Islamique du Salut 
(FIS). 
Early in 1990, the FIS handily outpolled the FLN in provincial and 
municipal elections.  The broad public response prompted the Bendjedid regime 
to suspend the June 1991 parliamentary elections and arrest the FIS’s leadership 
– Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj.  When elections resumed in January of 1992, 
the first round of balloting indicated another overwhelming FIS victory.  Famously 
fearing “one man, one vote, one time”, the civilian and military elites behind 
Bendjedid convinced him to resign.  In the ensuing confusion, elections were 
cancelled, parliament suspended and a national High Council of State (HCS) was 
established with formerly exiled FLN war hero, Mohammed Boudiaf at its head.  
As popular unrest cascaded into violence.  The HCS outlawed the FIS and 
unleashed the state’s security apparatus.  By July of 1992, Boudiaf had been 
assassinated and the HCS appointed one of its own, Ali Kafi, to the presidency.  
Although unable to participate politically, the FIS swiftly formed an armed wing, 
the Armee Islamique du Salut (AIS).  Conventional clashes with government 
troops continued through 1993 when the extremist Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) 
emerged as the force behind a campaign of assassinations and bombings.  In a 
single generation, Algeria had slipped from the optimistic exuberance of 
independence to the despairing horror of civil war.  The party of nationalism, 
social justice and hope found itself in a mortal struggle with violent 
Fundamentalists. 
1. FLN 
The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) formed in March of 1954 as the 
result of a conference of opponents to French rule (the Revolutionary Committee 
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for Unity and Action).  By October of 1954, the FLN was sponsoring coordinated 
guerilla attacks on symbols of colonial rule:  military posts, police stations, public 
offices and communications centers.  By 1956, the FLN had expanded its 
campaign to all of Algeria’s cities, the Algerian borders with Tunisian and 
Morocco, as well as continental France.  After independence in 1962, the FLN 
became the only legal political party in the autocratic, socialist state.  The party 
maintained this privileged position until 1989 when Chadli Bendjedid legalized 
political opposition.  In 1990, Islamists won early rounds of national elections.  By 
1991, the army had formally seized power, nullifying the elections and putting an 
end to the FLN’s 37 year dominance of Algerian political life. 
2. ALN 
Formed in 1954, The Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN) served as the 
conventional armed wing of the FLN.  Though radical armed elements of the ALN 
engaged in an intentional campaign of guerilla warfare and terrorism, the bulk of 
the ALN spent the duration of the War of Independence drilling just across the 
border in Tunisia.  This large conventional force served to tie up a sizable 
percentage of French troops in border security missions.  As a further 
consequence, the FLN developed into two factions:  those who fought within 
Algeria and those that threatened from without.  By the time the French withdrew 
in 1962, the Insiders were exhausted while the Outsiders were fresh.  As a result, 
the Outside element of the FLN held sway in the post-independence political 
maneuvering.  
3. Ahmed Ben Bella 
Ben Bella formed the FLN in 1954.  Imprisoned by the French from 1956-
1962, he served as a symbolic leader for the Algerian independence movement.  
Released in ’62 as part of the peace agreement with France, Ben Bella returned 
to a hero’s welcome in Algiers.  He ran unopposed in the first post-independence 
national elections.  After his inauguration, Ben Bella focused on reestablishing 
domestic order and agrarian reforms.  However, his increasingly autocratic rule 
led to a split within the FLN.  Ben Bella was deposed in June of 1965 through a 
bloodless coup.  He spent the next fifteen years in house arrest followed by a 
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decade in exile.  Based in Paris, Ben Bella devoted his time organizing an 
opposition movement against the very institution he helped create, the FLN. 
4. Houri Boumedienne 
Boumedienne joined the guerilla opposition to French rule in 1954, 
eventually commanding the military district around Oran.  By 1960, as the FLN 
chief of staff, he concentrated his efforts on raising the ALN regular forces in 
Morocco and Tunisia.  When a peace treaty was signed in 1962, Boumedienne 
commanded the only element of FLN power not devastated by the conflict with 
France.  His support proved vital in elevating Ben Bella to the presidency and 
secured for himself the positions of defense minister and vice president.  
Increasingly concerned by Ben Bella’s autocratic leadership, Boumedienne led a 
coup in June of 1965 installing himself as president.  After a period of weak and 
indecisive collegial rule, Boumedienne asserted personal control over Algeria in 
1967 by foiling another coup attempt.  By the early 1970s, he had instituted a 
socialist state with nationalized industries.  The explosion of petro-wealth in the 
mid to late 70s engendered an associated population explosion and growth of 
popular expectations for Algeria’s economic and social development.  Houri 
Boumedienne died suddenly in 1978. 
5. FIS 
The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) formed in 1989 as the result of 
Bendjedid’s legalization of political opposition.  Actually an umbrella organization 
for a host of pre-existing Islamic civic organizations, the FIS embraced two roles.  
The first role was as a political party working within the larger and recently 
opened political process.  The second role was as a populist movement that led 
marches, rallies and strikes to both air its constituents’ grievances and to 
demonstrate the power of that constituency.  At times, FIS mobilized as many as 
three quarters of a million Algerians in silent protest.  Algeria’s largest opposition 
party took on an overtly Islamic frame for four reasons:  the failure of socialism, 
the disgrace of Arab nationalism, the resurgence of Berber and Arab ethnic 
identity, and the failure of FLN moderates to reform the state.  The FIS coalition 
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handily defeated the FLN slate of candidates during the 1990 and 1991 local and 
regional elections. 
6. GIA 
The Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) formed gradually in the early 1990’s as 
a loose association of violent urban youth groups and veterans of the Arab/Soviet 
conflict in Afghanistan.  This volatile combination advocated an especially bloody 
and uncompromising form of holy war or jihad against the Algerian state.  The 
GIA insisted upon a program of Quran, Sunna and Salafiya tradition; nothing 
more and nothing less.  This meant a rejection of democracy, negotiation and 
secular rule of any kind.  More significantly, the GIA program required Muslims of 
other traditions to renounce their earlier beliefs and adhere to the Salafiya 
tradition as a prerequisite to membership.  Increasingly, these militants defined 
“us” and “them” in very narrow terms.56  Eventually, the GIA added other 
Islamists (including civilians) to their list of Takfir.  By 1994 this exclusive terrorist 
organization had begun a dedicated campaign of brutal anti-civilian violence.  
GIA exported their campaign to France in 1995.57 
7. Chadli Bendjedid 
Bendjedid was an early standout for the ALN, eventually commanding the 
13th Battalion along the Tunisian border.  After initially supporting Ben Bella’s 
ascendance to the premiership, Bendjedid supported the Boumedienne led coup 
which deposed Ben Bella in 1965.  Bendjedid devoted most of the 60s and 70s to 
solidifying his control over the Oran military command.  He served as Minister of 
Defense late in the Boumedienne administration.  The death, by illness, of 
Boumedienne in December of 1978 set off a power struggle within the FLN.  
Proposed as a compromise between two other candidates, Bendjedid was 
inaugurated in February of 1979.  As president, he focused on agricultural and 
economic reform, privatizing many state-owned industries.  Reelected in non-
competitive elections in 1984 and 1988, Bendjedid attempted to quell popular 
unrest by introducing a number of democratic reforms in 1989.  These reforms 
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were resoundingly rejected by the electorate when the Islamic FIS won early 
rounds of national elections in 1991.  Bendjedid’s position further deteriorated 
when the army stepped in to nullify the 1991 elections.  Military leaders eased 
Bendjedid out of office in January of 1992. 
8. Mohamed Boudiaf 
A longtime opponent to FLN rule, Boudiaf was sent into exile in 1964.  
After the ouster of Bendjedid, Boudiaf was brought back to act as the civilian face 
of the Algerian military leadership.  Though sworn in as president in January of 
1992, he served only five months before being assassinated in June 1992. 
9. Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
An early firebrand of the FLN and rising star in the late 70s, Bouteflika’s 
political career appeared to meet an early demise with corruption charges and 
exile in 1980.  During a brief visit to his homeland in 1994, Bouteflika declined an 
offer from the ruling military junta to take over as unelected head of state.  
However, in the subsequent 1999 elections, he was widely viewed as the army’s 
candidate.  He pledged to negotiate with the FIS and bring an end to Algeria’s 
bloody civil war.  Bouteflika was reelected in 2004. 
10. Abbasi Madani 
Madani was a political activist in the early 1950s and was arrested 17 
days after Algeria's war for independence broke out in 1954. He was released in 
1962 and called for democratic elections and pluralism.58  Nonetheless, he found 
that his preference for Islamic Fundamentalism was out of favor in the new 
government. By 1966, Madani was in such ill favor with the FLN that he quit 
formal politics and chose an academic career.  He eventually became a 
professor at Algiers University and later earned his doctorate in Britain. In 1982, 
Madani became a political figure once again when he intervened at the expense 
of established Islamist groups at the university in a controversy over the 
replacement of French by Arabic. Consequently, he was jailed for four years. In 
October 1988, Madani led a disciplined rank of Islamists to march despite army 
gun-fire. The army was called to reestablish law and order in Algiers after it was 
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taken over by the mob. Within a year, Algeria became the first North African 
country to legalize an Islamic party.59 
11. Ali Belhaj 
Madani’s alter-ego, Ali Belhaj, acted equally as loyal Lieutenant and 
advocate for the more provocative philosophies of Qutb and Mawdudi.  Born in 
Tunisia, Belhaj was a war orphan who received only an Arab-Islamic religious 
education.  His more dogmatic approach included the call for the immediate 
embrace of Sharia and denunciation of the West.  Belhaj found himself 
imprisoned from 1982 to 1987 as a result of his more confrontational Islamist 
style.  However, this only increased his popularity amongst Algeria’s youth.60 
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Up until 1998 only two men had manipulated the levers of the Indonesian 
state.  Sukarno and Suharto each understood the major political forces which 
they faced- the Islamists, the army, and the Communists.  Each man differed in 
his political leanings- Sukarno to the left and Suharto to the right- but each 
actively sought to shape society.  The common policy thread for both men was 
the interpretation of Pancasila.  Indonesia’s “five pillars” remained constant 
through both presidents’ tenure, and, in fact, remains constant even today.  
Pancasila provided a means to govern and provided the flexibility for each man 
to choose his methods of rule.  Sukarno invented Pancasila in the hope of uniting 
Indonesia and solidifying his power; Suharto built upon this philosophy and, as a 
result, further strengthened the Indonesian state.   
But just as Pancasila provided options for the rulers, it also provided 
options for the societal players.  It was this flexibility that provided a framework 
for the Islamist NU to evolve into a champion for democracy.  Pancasila allowed 
for NU to have an option to gain a political voice in a legal and peaceful manner.  
Through an historical narrative, this chapter hopes to shed light on how the 
actions of state leaders can cause significant societal change; sometimes these 
actions lead to horrific violence; sometimes these actions can lead to peaceful 
reform.  The final goal of this paper is to demonstrate the potential states have in 
shaping fundamentalist Islamic groups to becoming proponents for democratic 
and peaceful societies, but the historical narrative will also provide the forum to 
demonstrate that even in Muslim societies, the role of religion is just one of many 






B. INITIAL CONSOLIDATION 
We the people of Indonesia hereby declare Indonesia’s 
independence.  Matters concerning the transfer of power and other 
matters will be executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest 
possible time.61 
President Sukarno, 17 August 1945 
  
The above quotation illustrates that Indonesians looked to Sukarno to give 
the new state direction.  He was the single most powerful figure in Indonesian 
politics and, therefore, the one most capable of directing policy.  He did not, 
however, inherit an enviable societal situation.  Outside of the obvious 
geographical limitations of uniting an archipelago covering some 17,000 islands, 
Sukarno faced a culture that had many different views on what the nature of the 
Indonesian state should be.  Would Sukarno choose to use Islam as a means for 
the “transfer of power and other matters?”  Where would Communism fit in with 
the new nation?  Could the army be contained?  Could the Pancasila-based 
constitution hold the key to unite Indonesians around a single cause?  Sukarno’s 
quotation foreshadowed the uncertain and chaotic times that Indonesia would 
soon encounter and the difficult socio-political decisions Sukarno would face as 
leader of the state.  What direction would Sukarno drive the state?   This section 
will present Sukarno as the decision-maker of the Indonesian state.  His 
ideological legitimacy was founded upon the Pancasila constitution.  And with 
this legitimacy, he sought to create a state faced with three major societal 
influences - the army, the Communists, and the Islamists. 
Many critics of the Muslim world would assume that given the situation 
Sukarno faced, Islamization of the state would undoubtedly be the course of 
governance.  In a nation that is ninety percent Muslim and contains the world’s 
largest Muslim population, Islamists would surely drive Indonesia to becoming an 
Islamic state.  Islamization of Indonesian politics, though, has not occurred.  
From its colonial times and during the reign of its two presidents, Sukarno and 
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Suharto, Indonesia has maintained a relatively secular state.  Sukarno inherited 
this secular tradition and built upon it.  The state has withstood the pressure of 
several Islamic groups to Islamize.  Although unsuccessful in achieving societal 
stability, Sukarno chose a path for the Indonesian state counter to Islamist 
desires and sought to form a state more resembling Turkey then, say, Pakistan.  
Indonesia, much like Turkey, set out to define itself through modernization and 
nationalism and not religion.  Sukarno was not helpless at the hands of Islamists.  
Sukarno could have used the Islamist card more prominently, but he did not.  He 
faced the difficult situation enacting state policy that would balance Communism, 
the army and the Islamists.  Each group had an ideal for what the state should 
resemble and Sukarno embarked on an experiment to forge a new nation.  He 
based his leadership on the legitimizing concept of Pancasila.  To better 
understand Sukarno’s situation, this paper must first briefly examine the 
Indonesian state’s inherited colonial influences. 
1. The Inherited State 
a. The Dutch 
The Dutch provided Indonesians with the basic tools to form a 
nation, but failed to provide a unifying ideology.  Sukarno eventually filled the 
ideological void with Pancasila, but it was the Dutch who initially forged the 
beginnings of a modern state.  They introduced the modern world to Indonesians.  
Modern state necessities like bureaucracy and education were introduced by the 
Dutch. The Dutch, much like the rest of the European colonial powers, came to 
Asia seeking wealth, prestige and empire growth.  The Dutch began as merely 
traders, but by 1619, they had invaded Indonesia and founded Batavia (present-
day Jakarta).  As the Dutch expanded their control over much of the Indonesian 
archipelago to counter the ongoing British expansion, they required increased 
efficiency and manpower.  A modernization push ensued, requiring a more 
involved and educated local populace.62  A by-product of this expansion was the 
emergence of an educated class that acquired the tools of Western knowledge 
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and developed the ideas for future indigenous revolts.63  The more educated the 
populace became, the more aware they became of their unfair treatment at the 
hands of the Dutch.  The Dutch as leaders of the state were enacting policy that 
would eventually influence the demise of the colonial state. 
In addition to the nationalist movement that the Dutch helped to 
instill, several other areas of society also began to take shape during their rule.  
The beginnings of corruption can be traced back to the Dutch way of doing 
business.  The Dutch East India Company only paid its officials minor salaries 
with the expectation that they would seek out their own business in 
compensation.  The Dutch gave the Indonesians an example of profiting outside 
of central control, a practice seen even today, both within the military and 
business communities.64  In a way, this influence can be seen in the landmark 
Sukarno decision to allow the Indonesian military to independently run 
nationalized Dutch companies.  Instead of the state taking control of funding the 
military, Sukarno left it in the hands of the military.  This idea of a self-funded 
military is even today a major issue as Indonesia moves toward democratic 
reform.  Society did not invent corruption and military privatization of business; 
the state had made policy decisions that allowed for these occurrences. 
Another societal player, the Indonesian army also emerged under 
the Dutch.  The army was to become the single most influential player in 
Indonesian politics.  The Dutch provided the initial capability to stage a revolution 
when they formed the Indonesian military. The Dutch, feeling vulnerable to attack 
in Europe as a result of World War I, did not have the available manpower to 
spare to its colonies and saw the need to form local armies.  They began to train 
Indonesians.  It was this small nucleus of trained military professionals, combined 
with irregular troops, who fought the Dutch on the way to Indonesian 
independence.65  The military was the most well-organized and powerful 
institution during colonial times.  The Dutch state may have felt the need to form 
                                            
63 Tarling 1999: 149. 
64 Crouch 1988: 293. 
65 Wild 1988: 72-74. 
37 
a military, but the fact remains that it was a conscious decision.  Inventing an 
Indonesian military greatly changed the shape of Indonesian society. 
Corruption, combined with the example of elite rule, also gave rise 
to another future societal influence.  The Communist movement, much like in the 
rest of the world, was emerging in Indonesia during the latter period of colonial 
rule, despite the efforts at repression by the Dutch.  The Dutch began a pattern of 
violence against Communist that would eventually culminate with the 1965 
massacre.  In the 1920’s the Dutch government in West Java supported Islamic 
youth gangs’ terrorizing of Communist groups.  Not only was this planting the 
seed of Muslim/Communist conflict, but it also began to instill among the 
populace the perception that government was weak.  The Islamic leader Haji 
Agus Salim stated that the government “was playing with fire encouraging 
violence and placing its opponents beyond the protection of the law; in the end, 
such a course could only sabotage all respect for authority.”66  The state 
demonstrated its weakness and its implicit approval that social violence to 
maintain power was acceptable. 
The volatile legacy the Dutch bequeathed to Indonesia was a 
spirited nationalism without a foundation upon which to build a nation.  The Dutch 
invented the modern state framework and its associated institutions, but they 
lacked an ideology that would give them legitimacy.  Sukarno was able to build 
on the Dutch state and hoped that the Pancasila philosophy would allow for a 
unifying of Indonesians and a legitimation of his authority, but the task was to be 
a difficult one.  The Dutch state left Sukarno with the unenviable situation of 
forming a policy that could shape Communist, Islamist, and army sensibilities 
around his vision of the Indonesian state. 
b. The Japanese 
Although Japanese presence in Indonesia was much shorter than 
the Dutch stay, the Easterners also greatly influenced society through their 
actions as state leaders.  In fact, even prior to actually assuming the reigns of 
power, the Japanese were influencing Indonesians.  Four decades prior to                                             
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invading Indonesia, Japan had already influenced local nationalism with its 
victory in the Russo/Japanese War.  Indonesians, although lacking any close ties 
to Japan, witnessed for the first time that Asians could defeat non-Asians.  This 
fact was not lost on Indonesians with the arrival of the Japanese to Indonesia - 
Japan was a symbol of what was possible.  Japan demonstrated that the 
Westerners could be defeated, and, therefore, Indonesians felt at least some sort 
of tie to their Asian rulers.  The humiliating ten-day defeat of the Dutch and the 
contempt with which the Japanese treated their prisoners-of-war forever 
tarnished the Dutch aura of superiority.  The strong Japanese state forever 
changed the Indonesian cultural view of inferiority to Westerners.   
Japan encouraged the formation of anti-Western organizations and 
sought to breed a spirit of Asian unity.   They streamlined government and 
education and eliminated the Dutch dual system of colonial rule.  Education and 
government jobs became available to more people.  Also, the colonialists 
exposed more of the nation to the Japanese obsession with modernization.67  
Japanese governance and modernization often included the local populace and 
gave Indonesians a taste of at least partial independence.   The Japanese state 
moved Indonesians a step closer to having the ability to achieve independence. 
During their occupation, the Japanese actively sought to use 
Islamic groups to maintain social calm.  They created the Department of 
Religious Affairs, staffed almost exclusively by Muslims, and allowed for 
Indonesia’s first official Islamic political party, Masyumi, which included 
Indonesia’s two largest Islamic groups, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.68  
The Japanese state allowed for Islamization to occur, feeling that this would help 
to legitimize the state.  The colonial state set the tone for future state/Nahdlatul 
Ulama interaction.  The Japanese were the first to give a political voice to 
Islamists; it was a voice the Islamists were reluctant to give up. 
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The Japanese treatment of the local populace was extremely brutal 
at times.69  The behavior of the Japanese simply solidified the locals’ belief that 
independence was the only alternative.  Colonialism, whether European or Asian, 
was now unacceptable to Indonesians.  With the defeat of Japan in World War II, 
the stage was set for the “era of revolution.”70  The power vacuum the defeated 
Japanese left was a prime opportunity for the Indonesian nationalist movement to 
actually achieve success.  By 1949, Indonesia had gained its independence, and 
Sukarno moved forward to define a state inherited from the colonialists and to 
shape a populace that was ideologically divided. 
2. Independence 
As Indonesia tested the waters of sovereignty, its politics were quite 
explosive.  Sukarno faced the daunting challenge of enacting a state policy that 
would appease the numerous ideological societal divides.  As previously 
mentioned, Sukarno was generally accepted as the rightful leader of the new 
state.  In effect, he had been given the reigns of power, backed with the 
Pancasila constitution, to shape the state as he saw fit.  The views on how best 
to proceed covered a vastly different ideological spectrum.  Public opinion, in 
general, fit into three categories.  On the one hand, there were the Marxists, 
calling for radical change in all of Indonesia, including rejecting the global 
economy and throwing out all foreign business. A second ideology can be 
described as “developmentalist.”  This idea believed in building on the colonial 
state that was already in place.  It focused on improving the existing 
infrastructure, education, and investment.  The colonial bureaucracy would 
simply be replaced by an Indonesian one. A final movement centered on Muslim 
nationalism, calling for an Islamic state.  This movement promoted the idea that 
Islam would hold Indonesia together and signal that it was truly independent.71  
Sukarno attempted to form a policy to mesh all these differing viewpoints into a 
workable state. 
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a. The State and the Army 
The army came to represent the most substantial threat to 
Sukarno’s authority and legitimacy.  The army had never been happy with 
Sukarno and his cooperation with the Japanese and Dutch.  This tension often 
strained the legitimacy of the Sukarno state.  Early and often in Sukarno’s 
presidency, the army sought to counter state decisions legally, politically, and, 
eventually, violently.  Sukarno had the ability to make independent policy 
decisions, but the army represented the most influential segment of all the 
societal players.  As a result, Sukarno often chose policies meant to appease the 
army.  These decisions increasingly empowered the military and lessened 
Sukarno’s hold on power.   
Initially, though, Sukarno sought to challenge the army.  In 1952 
segments of the army attempted to have parliament peacefully dissolved, known 
as the “Seventeenth of October Affair.”  The crux of the affair came down to a 
divide within the armed forces between the technocrats and the irregulars.  The 
politics of the national military were controlled by former Dutch-trained 
technocrats, and led by the young army chief-of-staff, General Nasution.  The 
disenfranchised group was the less-educated, less-trained irregular army forces 
who had helped in the struggle against the Dutch, and mostly had its power base 
at the local, rural level.  General Nasution sought to solidify his control of the 
army by decreasing the size of the irregular army.  Parliament, though, sided with 
the irregulars, possibly due to its fear of a consolidated control of the army under 
one man.  Nasution and the technocrats, displeased with this civilian intrusion on 
military matters, staged demonstrations and called for a new parliament.72  
Though unsuccessful, the situation demonstrated two future problematic themes.  
Firstly, the army was to be a formidable political force.  There was no doubt in its 
desire to affect policy and manipulate the levers of the state.  Secondly, the 
“Seventeenth of October Affair” demonstrated that the acting state still did have 
its legitimacy and short of an outright violent coup, the parliament’s decisions 
were the law of the land.  Sukarno as the leader of the state could have backed 
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down to Nasution, but he did not.  It is an example of the state having options 
and not simply deferring helplessly to societal forces. 
Eventually, though, Sukarno’s legitimacy as the driver of the state 
began to weaken, even as early as 1955.  Sukarno was unable to form any sort 
of political consensus, and this fact made governance difficult.  His weakness 
had the effect of unifying the army.73  He had not demonstrated to the army that 
he had the substantial support needed to rule.  In 1955, the army began a move 
toward actually controlling the levers of the state by refusing the Indonesian 
Cabinet’s appointment of a new chief of staff and signaling that decisions in the 
Sukarno state were not necessarily law.  This caused a lack of confidence and 
eventual crumbling of the Cabinet.74  This is the first real sign that perhaps two 
states were emerging- one controlled by Sukarno and one controlled by the 
army. 
b. The State and the Communists 
Sukarno faced another substantial societal influence in the 
Communists.  The Communists lacked sufficient violent force to protect itself, 
and, as a result, Sukarno had another policy option available to him that was not 
an option in dealing with the army.  Sometimes the president felt that the best 
solution was violent preemptive repression.  The Madiun Rebellion of 1948 
marked the beginning of army/Communist conflict that eventually culminated in 
the tragedy of 1965.  As the Sukarno/Hatta government came to power, PKI 
feared that its local Communist-led armed militias were to be disbanded.  Feeling 
cornered, PKI revolted and Sukarno reacted with force by calling in the regular 
national army.  It was the first notable conflict between the army and the 
Communists.  Several prominent PKI leaders were killed, causing a severe blow 
to PKI in their pursuit of government control, but it by no means ended the 
Communist movement.75  At this point in Sukarno’s presidency, he chose to side 
with the army to legitimize his authority. 
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The failed rebellion and the violent reaction by the Sukarno state 
caused PKI to shift tactics.  PKI’s new accommodation strategy, coupled with the 
army’s growing influence, led Sukarno to increasingly side with the Communists.  
The remarkable organizational recovery of the Communists following the Madiun 
Rebellion provided Sukarno with a tool to stymie army power.  The Communists 
were gaining strength and provided the president with a potential ally and 
counterweight to the military.  Realizing its disadvantage against the army, PKI 
gradually and quietly embarked upon a campaign of “agitation, organization and 
mobilization of the masses.”76  PKI became an organizational success story, 
expanding its membership between 1952 and 1962 from 7910 to over 2 million.  
PKI was poised for great success, but it never got the chance because of 
Sukarno’s decision to declare martial law, a decision that greatly increased the 
army’s legitimacy as state policy makers.  Sukarno’s martial law policy signaled a 
drastic change in state power.  The army now had a footing in dictating state 
policy.  This fact eventually led to the downfall of both Sukarno and PKI.  
c. The State and the Islamists 
The Muslims presented a different challenge for the Indonesian 
state.  They were a sort of wildcard because they did not present the coherent 
threat to the state that the Communists and the army did.  The Islamic 
community was not united politically with the exception of desiring Islam to have 
influence in governance.  This fact allowed for other competing groups to gain 
their favor.  In fact, the bitterness between Masyumi and NU-supporting santri 
Muslims and PNI-supporting abangan Muslims was quite heated.77  Religious 
ideological differences aside, the two Muslim groups also represented different 
geographic regions in the island nation, making unity even more difficult.  These 
differences not only made Muslim unity difficult, but it also made using the 
Islamic card more difficult for the state.  Sukarno could not easily be seen as a 
voice for all Muslims because Muslims themselves did not have one voice. 
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As Indonesia moved toward independence, the Islamists, 
nevertheless, still enjoyed significant cultural and political influence.  Sukarno 
faced a difficult situation in meshing Indonesia’s conflicting ideals during the 
actual formulation of Pancasila in 1945.  Sukarno faced a dilemma in forming the 
constitution: bow to santri Muslim leaders for an Islamic state or bow to non-
Muslims and secularists leaving Islam out of the state.  For santri Muslims, 
vagueness in the role of God in Indonesia proved unpalatable.  Originally, the 
first principle was stated simply as “belief in God.”  This phrasing was 
unsatisfactory to many Muslim leaders, and the constitution committee agreed to 
change the principle to “belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to 
carry out Islamic law,” known to this day as the Jakarta Charter.78  Not 
surprisingly, the non-Muslims and secularists, as well as Sukarno, disagreed with 
this choice and the added Islamic emphasis.  Sukarno and his second-in-
command, Mohammad Hatta, needed to find a compromise.  Nahdlatul Ulama 
gave them one.  NU suggested that a compromise between the two versions was 
to state the first principle as “belief in a singular God.”79  Though far from perfect 
for either group, it was a workable agreement, and it gave the emerging nation at 
least a loose framework with which to proceed.  Sukarno clearly demonstrated an 
aversion to the Islamization of the political process and was successful lessening 
the role of Islam. 
Darul Islam represented an example of the Islamist political voice.  
It was a movement pushing for an Islamic state and particularly active in Aceh, 
West Java, and South Sulawesi.  In 1948 the movement’s leaders even declared 
a new state, Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State), and declared 
the current republic illegitimate.  The movement continued into the 1960’s and 
through its evolution, Darul Islam increasingly focused its attention on PKI and its 
growing influence in government.80 81  The movement never realistically 
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threatened the cohesion of the Indonesian state, however, demonstrating that 
Sukarno’s relatively secular policy was working and acceptable to the vast 
majority of the Muslim community.  The movement, though, does provide another 
glimpse into Indonesian society being far from homogenous in its beliefs and the 
difficulties state leaders face in enacting effective policy.  Islamic tensions did 
exist, but the Islamists could not compel the state was bow to its pressures. 
NU continued to participate peacefully in Sukarno’s relatively 
secular state.  Until 1952, NU was part of a conglomeration of Islamic interests 
that formed the Muslim political party Masyumi.  In 1952, NU departed Masyumi 
in an effort to pursue its more clearly defined traditionalist policies.  NU was 
increasingly at odds with the modernist Muhammadiyah.  If santri Muslims could 
have put up a more united front, the 1955 elections might have turned out 
differently. Masyumi, NU and other smaller Islamic parties accounted for over 40 
percent of the vote.82  It was interesting to note that Indonesia had a Muslim 
population upwards of 90 percent.  A very large number of Muslims, mostly of the 
abangan type, supported the nationalists and the Communists.  NU witnessed 
both the positive and negative in defining itself as a political party.  NU enjoyed 
substantial support, yet that support was not substantial enough to achieve 
political consensus. 
  Sukarno, possibly due to the relative lack of Islamic unity, never 
felt a need to unite Indonesia around an Islamic identity.  The Sukarno state, due 
to the fragmentation of Islamic society, did not need to Islamize the government.  
Although Islamization was an available tool Sukarno could have used, it never 
became the defining cultural characteristic of Indonesian society. 
d. Society Too Divided 
Sukarno as the driver of the state may have been in an impossible 
situation.  Too many cultural institutions had too much influence.   His strategy 
could be simply defined as allying with PKI, appeasing the army, and ignoring the 
Islamists.   A demonstration of the difficulty Sukarno must have had in plotting 
Indonesia’s political course, one need only to examine the 1955 elections.  In                                             
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spite of the numerous societal differences, Indonesia did, in fact, conduct 
successful free elections in 1955 (not until 1998 would another free election 
occur), but as Indonesia was to demonstrate, free elections are no guarantor of 
stable governance.  Sukarno did not have the social consensus to rule 
effectively.  Sixteen parties held at least one seat in parliament, and there were 
still deep-seated societal differences. The Communist movement was indeed 
substantial.  PKI, growing rapidly in strength, won 16.4 percent of the vote.  The 
other major political parties, the Nationalist Party, the modernist Muslim Masyumi 
and the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama, won 22.3, 20.9 and 18.4 percent, 
respectively.83  Obviously, there was no clear consensus being formed, and a 
second round of voting failed to solve the issue.  Almost immediately after the 
1955 elections, Sukarno was already contemplating the need for a “Guided 
Democracy.”84   
With Sukarno dealing with Darul Islam, PRRI and Permesta 
rebellions, PKI situated itself as a friend of the president.  The timing was perfect 
for Sukarno as well.  He was facing stiff challenges from the army and the 
Islamists.  In 1959 Aidit described the PKI philosophy: “the PKI uses Marxism-
Leninism as a constant guide in determining the character of its policy; it also 
bases its decisions on the existing balance in social forces.  The PKI is obliged to 
continuously calculate the balance in the unstable social forces in Indonesia.”85  
Sukarno had apparently found the least-threatening ally in PKI.  It was a party 
that appeared to have no obvious desires to drastically change the state or the 
ruler of the state and provided the best means to counter the increasingly 
threatening army.   
Sukarno’s left-leaning stance brought the president and the army 
into closer conflict.  The well-organized PKI was obviously a threat to army 
influence.  Also, Sukarno’s allying with Communism pushed the Islamists away 
from the president and closer to the army.  The closer Sukarno allied with PKI, 
                                            
83 Ibid: 43. 
84 Kingbury 1998: 41. 
85 Crouch 1988: 286. 
46 
the closer NU allied with the army.  As communism grew and Sukarno 
increasingly accommodated its movement, NU was cornered into allying with the 
army.  The Indonesian state, in a way, had shunned Islam.  The state had 
offended Islamic sensibilities by siding with an atheist ideal like communism.  
Sukarno’s policies continued to shape society. 
C. THE FALL OF SUKARNO 
The optimism of the 1955 free elections soon gave way to the bleak 
picture that two states were emerging.  The players had not changed.  Sukarno 
still controlled state policy that would directly affect the army, the Communists, 
and the Islamists.  It was the army with its access to force and its own 
bureaucracy that soon came to resemble its own state.  Sukarno policy also had 
the effect of legitimizing the army and their self-autonomous ways.  Ten years of 
social unrest eventually erupted in the tragic events of 1965.  Sukarno failed to 
enact the proper state policies that would have prevented the army from 
becoming effectively self-autonomous.  The most severe was allowing the army’s 
nationalization of Dutch property, but he also made other strategic errors.  
Although Sukarno did not inherit a thriving economy, his economic policy failed to 
improve the situation.  He attempted to use nationalism to solidify his power, and 
this led to taking hard stance against any perceived Western influence.  He led 
Indonesia into economic ruins with a nationalist policy of high public ownership 
and high tariffs, effectively isolating Indonesia from the global economy.  At the 
same time, he was spending excessively on the military both to appease the 
army and to pursue an ill-conceived Indonesian pride campaign of trying to pick a 
fight with Malaysia.  The resultant effects were 1000 percent inflation and a 
poverty level of over 60 percent.86  Sukarno’s state decisions directly led to a 
failed economy and an emerging army capable of pulling the levers of the state. 
1. Sukarno Losing Control 
The army’s ability in 1955 to refuse the appointment of a new army chief 
of staff was a prime example of the decreasing legitimacy of the Sukarno state.  
Two states were emerging: the army’s and Sukarno’s.  Sukarno, having won no 
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clear support in the 1955 parliamentary elections, continued his balancing act 
between the military, the Communists, and the Muslims.  During the fight for 
independence from the Dutch, the military had been organized territorially, 
allowing regional commands to receive supplies and support from local villages.  
With Jakarta unable to effectively fund the military, leading officers in those 
territories began to set up their own businesses.   
If there was one decision that solidified the military’s place in Indonesian 
society, it was the nationalization of Dutch property in 1957.87  Demonstrating its 
political influence, the army essentially took control of the newly nationalized 
properties.  Although the Indonesian economy was already in shambles, in large 
part due to an un-manageable post-colonial debt, it was the military, not society, 
which benefited from the nationalization.  The military solidified its position by 
having a privately-funded organization, isolating itself further from civilian control.  
In effect, the military was becoming its own state. 
Following the nationalization of Dutch property, the Indonesian state faced 
its most significant challenge to the republic with the PRRI-Permesta rebellion. 
When all Dutch property was nationalized, Sumatra and Sulawesi were 
physically isolated due to the lack of transportation.  Also, the worsening 
economic situation was most severe outside of Java.  Power and governance 
was centered in Java, and the outlying regions sought greater independence.  
On 10 February 1958, rebels in West Sumatra proclaimed the new Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia- PRRI).  Although Sukarno had effectively put Indonesia in a state of 
martial law in 1957, he was still was still reluctant to use the military to suppress 
Indonesian citizens.  The military, though, increasingly at odds with the left-
leaning Sukarno and gaining prestige, acted out on its own to crush the rebellion.  
Within two months the army had crushed the rebellion and further solidified its 
power in Indonesia.88  The republic had been saved, but it was the army who had 
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made the decision, not Sukarno.  It was now even less clear who represented the 
state: the army or Sukarno? 
2. Sukarno’s Last Stand 
Realizing the combination of challenges the military and a failing economy 
presented, Sukarno in 1959 attempted to consolidate his power by overturning 
the agreements reached in the 1955 elections and returned Indonesia to its 1945 
constitution, a constitution providing much more power to the executive, but still a 
constitution and based on Pancasila.  Sukarno instigated a new program known 
as “Guided Democracy.”  The army agreed to the program because it was given 
increased influence and gained control of several important industries through 
nationalization of Dutch property.89  Also included in Sukarno’s plan was the 
formation of NASAKOM, which rid Indonesia of political parties by combining the 
nationalist, religious, and Communist parties in one large organization.  In theory, 
the group was supposed to be an attempt at compromise to get past the bitter 
divisions that Indonesian politics faced.  It was supposed to be a display of unity.  
NASAKOM actually represented one of the last times that Sukarno attempted 
appeasement of the military.  The nationalists, primarily backed by the military, 
received much of Sukarno’s attention.  The Communists in the early stages and 
the Muslim groups were left without much real political power.90 
Sukarno and his NASAKOM policy at least initially garnered support from 
the Islamists.  Nahdlatul Ulama initially chose to support Sukarno and work within 
the political system to gain influence.  Sukarno rewarded NU with inclusion in 
NASAKOM, but this act still left NU without any real influence.  NASAKOM 
provided him a means to more effectively control NU’s political actions without 
allowing it any real power.91  In essence, NU’s influence was limited to 
influencing social issues through its running of the Department of Religion.  
Although Sukarno intended to isolate NU politically, NASAKOM had the 
unintended consequence pushing the Muslim organization to seek ties with the 
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army in the hopes of gaining more political leverage.92  NU came to view the 
Sukarno policy as detrimental to its cause. 
“Guided Democracy” and its associated NASAKOM failed in the desired 
result of unifying Indonesians around a common goal.  The differences were still 
unresolved and too complex.  NU did not want NASAKOM and neither did the 
army.  The army had, in fact, formed its own political party, GOLKAR, in 1964.93  
At the same time, PKI was at the height of its popularity.  Sukarno was forced to 
finally choose sides.  Perhaps, Sukarno realized that maintaining his authority 
while appeasing the military, specifically the army, was impossible.  By 1965, 
Sukarno had clearly moved to the Communist side and sought to diminish army 
power.  
At about the same time, the left-leaning air force sought to counter army 
influence by creating a “fifth” armed force, a move not opposed by Sukarno.  The 
man behind this idea was the air force commander, Omar Dhani who sought to 
arm the workers and peasants and destroy the army’s monopoly on armed 
power.  Very few of the armed forces officer corps favored the PKI, but in the air 
force the supporters represented the majority.  The air force’s first chief of staff, 
Air Marshall Surjadi Surjadarma and Omar Dhani’s predecessor had begun the 
service’s PKI leanings.94  The effect of the “fifth” force proposal combine with the 
land reform policy had two disastrous and unintended consequences.  Land 
reform had the effect of bringing the Communists into sometimes violent conflict 
with Muslims, who accounted for a substantial percentage of the middle class 
and land-owning elite.  And Dhani’s plan was completely unacceptable to the 
army and highlighted the growing left/right tensions within the military.   
This is not to say that Sukarno’s eventual demise was inevitable.  He still 
had substantial support within the military and sought political maneuverings to 
increase his control over the military.  The army was no doubt entrenched in the 
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state by 1965, primarily as a result of privatization and martial law.95  But the 
army as a whole was not united and the air force, navy, and police checked army 
power.  Sukarno, in fact, remained respected within several elements of the 
army.  These factors and the belief that much of the military would be amenable 
to a left-leaning Indonesian state provided Sukarno with the rationale to pursue 
his policy. 
Sukarno knew that influential elements within the army would not allow for 
increasing PKI influence.   Leading the anti-communist segment of the army was 
its chief, the devout Muslim, General Nasution.  Sukarno wanted an army chief 
more amenable, so he offered Nasution the post of director for defense and 
security, a post that would have given him power over all 4 services (army, navy, 
air force, and police).  Nasution agreed, but General Dhani of the air force 
protested.  In a move possibly orchestrated by Sukarno himself, a new 
agreement was reached that the four services would be directly under the control 
of the president.  Sukarno, although his influence was lessening, continued to 
make political decisions that would have an impact on the eventual makeup of 
the state.  He had offended the right-wing army with his checking of Nasution’s 
power and had offended Islamists by naming a less-fundamental replacement. 
This volatile situation in Indonesia triggered a series of confusing, tragic 
events. Sukarno was rumored to be ill, the Muslims saw Sukarno granting PKI 
more power, and the military was worried about divisions among its own ranks.96  
Confidence in Sukarno’s government was at an all-time low.  These tensions 
finally reached the breaking point with the still confusing “Thirtieth of September 
Movement.” 
3. Sukarno’s State Crumbles 
The events of 1965 signaled an end to Sukarno’s rule.  Supposedly, a 
commander in Sukarno’s palace guard, Lieutenant Colonel Untung had 
uncovered a treacherous “council of General’s,” including the Defence Minister 
General Nasution and Commander of the Army Yani, intent on overthrowing the 
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president.  A statement released by Untung’s “Thirtieth of September Movement” 
described the council as “a subversive movement sponsored by the CIA 
(consisting of) power-mad generals and officers who have neglected the lot of 
their men and who above the accumulated sufferings of their men have lived in 
luxury, led a gay life, insulted our women and wasted government funds.”97  
Untung’s movement kidnapped six officers, including Nasution, and killed three of 
them, including Yani.  The left-leaning air force General Dhani supported the 
movement as a “purge within the army,” no doubt pleased with the removal of the 
anti-Communists, Nasution and Yani.  But he and the PKI gravely miscalculated 
that Untung’s apparent foiling of the council would be enough to swing army 
leadership to the left.98 
Several in Untung’s group believed that Major General Suharto, 
commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) would be 
sympathetic to their cause.99  Quite the contrary, Suharto, in noting that the most 
senior army general was missing, assumed control of the entire army, 
condemned the rebels, and began spinning the story as a PKI plot to assume 
power.  On 1 October Suharto’s forces captured  Halim air force base and found 
Sukarno, Dhani, the head of PKI, and “Thirtieth of September Movement” leaders 
fleeing the scene, an occurrence that lent legitimacy to the PKI coup 
conspiracy.100  That evening Suharto announced over the radio that he had 
united the army and was “now able to control the situation both at the center and 
in the regions.”101  In effect, Indonesia had a new president, though it would not 
become official until March 1968. 
Was it the PKI behind the mysterious “Thirtieth of September Movement”?  
Army reformists?  Sukarno?  Or perhaps Suharto himself?  The fact that the 
“Thirtieth of September” events directly led to Suharto becoming president has 
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fueled much speculation, and little has changed since the initial recollections of 
1965.  In any event, Sukarno was effectively finished as legitimate ruler of the 
Indonesian state.  He had made several policy decisions that eventually provided 
Suharto with the opportunity to grab power.  Suharto successfully rallied the army 
behind him, effectively turned Suharto into a figurehead president, and severely 
damaged Communist credibility all over the span of a few days.  Sukarno’s poor 
decisions and miscalculations had gradually led Indonesia into a two-state 
system.  Regardless of who was behind the “coup,” Sukarno and his overt siding 
with PKI sealed his fate.  He drew the battle lines between his state and the army 
state.  Suharto was able to rally the army behind him and move Indonesia into a 
new state era known the New Order.  Sukarno’s state policies had opened the 
door for Suharto to assume reigns of power.  The former KOSTRAD commander 
began a methodical re-shaping of state policy that would lead to thirty years of 
New Order rule. 
4.  Summary of the Sukarno State 
Sukarno inherited a colonial state that was neither geographically nor 
ideologically united.  He did, however, initially possess the legitimacy to rule.  
The vast majority of the Indonesian populace accepted his right to rule.  With this 
backing, he formulated Pancasila, a constitutional framework that still exists 
today, and embarked on a political path attempting to unify three major societal 
players: the army, the Communists, and the Islamists.  He often pursued 
conflicting policies that would either appease or disgruntle these groups.  In the 
end, Sukarno’s state failed but the Indonesian state did not.  The Pancasila state 
was still very much alive, but it was soon to have a different man pulling the 
reigns.  Suharto was to attempt to solidify his power around the Pancasila state 
and was able to do so much more effectively because he only had one remaining 
legitimate challenge to his authority - the Islamists. 
D. SUHARTO’S RE-CONSOLIDATION 
So far, this paper has examined the Sukarno state and its dealings with 
three major societal groups: the army, the Communists, and the Islamists.  As 
Suharto asserted his authority in consolidating his legitimacy, the former general 
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effectively only had one remaining dissenter to his idea of the state.  The 
Islamists, and primarily NU, had hoped to benefit from its alliance with Suharto 
but soon found that Suharto had no intentions of Islamizing politics.  He 
continued to use Pancasila as a state foundation and manipulated the political 
environment making it impossible to criticize his state.  Following the destruction 
of PKI and the dominance of the army’s GOLKAR party, NU was overmatched in 
seeking political gain.  But rather than becoming violently anti-state, NU came to 
embrace the state philosophy of Pancasila and focus its criticism on Suharto’s 
interpretation the Pancasila  state. 
The few days between September and October of 1965 during the 
botched “coup” combined with the already present economic and social problems 
spawned a much larger social unrest that culminated with the tragic Communist 
massacre.  Although the massacre was not directly a military campaign, Suharto 
and his allies were the instigators.  NU’s participation is a violent example of the 
state manipulating cultural forces.  Suharto and the army set it up to look like the 
“spontaneous fury of ordinary citizens,” while in fact, it was the military that 
organized hundreds of thousands of vigilantes, including many NU members, 
and led to the slaughter of 500,000 men, women and children.102   The volatile 
mix of Sukarno’s attempt to maintain power, increasing tensions between the 
military and the Communists, and the disillusionment in the Muslim community 
came to a tragic end in 1965.  Sukarno’s attempt at consolidating power and 
defining the state ended in bloodshed and a chance for another leader to lead 
Indonesia.  A student member of Nahdlatul Ulama explained the time period in 
the following manner: 
We have found that wealthy farmers and religious leaders 
participated in the massacres, not out of religious conviction but 
because they had been told that they would lose their land to the 
Communists.  Our research has also shown that people who were 
good Muslims allowed themselves to be used by those who would 
inflame us to strike at their enemies for reasons having nothing to 
                                            
102 Hefner 2000: xii, 64. 
54 
do with Islam.  Those involved in the killings acted contrary to 
Islamic law and social justice.103 
Indonesia by the 1960’s was a nation in the midst of tremendous 
instability.  The economy was in shambles, the Communist movement, in step 
with the rest of Southeast Asia, was in full swing, and Muslims felt slighted by the 
political picture.  Suharto through a series of maneuvers, including the 
destruction of PKI, managed to legitimize his authority over the state much more 
effectively than Suharto had.  NU, both because of its participation in the 
massacre and in its disillusionment with the resultant lack of political gain, 
became the sole, worthy opponent to Suharto’s idea of the Indonesian state.  
Obviously NU had shown its capability of violence during the massacre, but 
facing Suharto repression, the Islamic organization began a completely different 
path, one of peaceful resolution and inclusion. 
1. Sukarno to Suharto 
Suharto’s fate as president was by no means settled following the 
“Thirtieth of September” movement.  Much doubt existed as to who would 
eventually control the state.  Even in the army, Suharto had his dissenters.  
Sukarno still had supporters such as Yani, who feared Suharto as president 
would bring in his own people and purge Yani and others like him.  The non-army 
services were also, in general, much more supportive of Sukarno.  These 
supporters felt Sukarno was the only chance to challenge the army.  Also, there 
was a sense of Javanist loyalty prevalent and Sukarno still maintained prestige 
as the “Father of Indonesia.”104 
 Sukarno, though, faced one major disadvantage.  Sukarno no longer had 
his ally and army counterweight, the PKI.  PKI had been Sukarno’s primary tool 
in countering army influence and now PKI was effectively finished as an 
organization.  Suharto had more control of the other remaining tools, the army 
and the Islamists.  Sukarno was essentially on his own against the army and the 
Islamists, with only Pancasila to support his presidency.  It was the adherence to 
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Pancasila that perhaps kept Sukarno around as long as he did.  Suharto, though, 
also used Pancasila as a legitimizing force for his presidency.  
Many in the army were dismayed by Sukarno ignoring the army in its 
desire to be better represented within the Cabinet.  Others, including possible 
Sukarno supporters, felt that increased army representation was better than 
Subandrio-and -Saleh-like representation.105  Sukarno’s struggle to remain in 
power may have been futile, but the fact remains that he was still making 
conscious policy decisions in the hopes of shaping a favorable political climate. 
Suharto also began to manipulate the levers of the state. Suharto 
understood he could not be seen as attempting an outright overthrow of Sukarno.  
Harold Crouch wrote that “Suharto needed a way to reject the cabinet without 
taking action that would force members of the armed forces to choose between 
Sukarno and Suharto.”106  The president, represented by Sukarno, was still 
viable within the state.  Suharto chose a strategy in concert with the radical anti-
Communist officer element to disrupt society, forcing Sukarno to rely more 
heavily on the army for stability.  The radical officers covertly encouraged student 
demonstrations.  Suharto then presented himself as a moderating force, as one 
who could regain social order.  He offered suggestions to Sukarno like removing 
certain members from his cabinet to appease the radicals and restore order.107  
Suharto, although he controlled the largest access to military force, still needed 
to operate within the acceptable state framework.  The acceptable state 
framework was still based upon the original Pancasila concept. 
On March 11, 1966 Sukarno made another damaging decision.  He angrily 
addressed his cabinet, ominously absent of Suharto, and re-affirmed his belief in 
Marxism.  During the meeting troops without insignia (supposedly to hide their 
Suharto alliance) massed in front of the presidential palace.  This fact eventually 
forced Sukarno to grant Suharto the authority “to take all measures considered 
necessary to guarantee security, calm, and the stability of the government and                                             
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the revolutions, and to guarantee the personal safety and authority of the 
President … in the interests of the unity of the Republic of Indonesia.”108  There 
are two key observations regarding this decision.  Firstly, Sukarno based this 
decision on Pancasila and the moldable principle of “the unity Indonesia,” 
demonstrating the importance of state leaders basing their actions on the 
constitution.  Secondly, Sukarno by granting Suharto “all measures considered 
necessary,” had greatly increased Suharto legal standing as the decision-maker 
of the state. 
Sukarno, though, still would not dismiss his offensive against the army 
cabinet ministers, but now Suharto turned this strategy around to serve his 
purposes.  Suharto used his new legitimacy to arrest certain ministers, but the 
ones he arrested were not loyal to him.  The targets, Suharto explained, were 
against those “whose connection with the PKI/Gestapo there are sufficient 
indications, (second,) whose good faith in the president…is doubted, (and third,) 
those who have amorally and asocially lived in luxury over the sufferings of the 
people.”109  Sukarno had granted Suharto authority to restore order, giving him 
the legitimacy to arrest, and now Sukarno was forced to acquiesce to Suharto, 
who was removing Sukarno supporters from the cabinet.  Suharto operated 
brilliantly in that he never forced Sukarno into too much of a corner.  He only 
asked for the removal of the modest number of fifteen ministers.  Suharto was 
careful not to overstep his authority too early.  In so doing, he gave Sukarno the 
hope that he could “outmaneuver” Suharto and his generals at a future date.110  
Suharto, in the end, overcame Sukarno because he manipulated the state 
more effectively.  Civil war had narrowly been avoided on several occasions, but 
both Sukarno and Suharto saw that their best chance in legitimate power lay 
within the current state system and MPRS (Indonesian parliament).  Militant 
Sukarno supporters in East Java had pleaded with him to lead a resistance; 
Suharto shunned the militant elements of the army who called for an armed 
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uprising.  The result was an eventual legal decision on succession of power.  
Parliament now had a more army-friendly make-up and as Old Order – New 
Order social unrest increased, the MPRS was forced to make a decision.  On 8 
March 1968, Sukarno was effectively removed from power.  He remained on 
house arrest until his death in June 1970.   
2. Suharto Alone 
Alone, Suharto was able to much more effectively control the Indonesian 
state for three main reasons.  First, he was able to consolidate the military and its 
monopoly of force much more effectively than Sukarno had.   With this control 
went an ability to control information within society.  Second, he enjoyed 
tremendous economic growth during his rule until the financial crisis of 1997.  
And, third, he aggressively demanded adherence to the Pancasila code, which 
both gave him the room to maneuver politically and to legitimize his authority.  
Suharto made state decisions that were perceived as good for the Indonesian 
state. 
To control society the state needs to have good information and as 
Suharto consolidated his control over most of the military, he also had the means 
to do so.  The territorial control of the armed forces allowed the army to be 
intimately involved in local society, and led to its dual function, dwifungsi, role in 
society.  The dual role meant acting both as a traditional national defense armed 
force as well as a local, domestic police force.  Acting as a local police force 
logically led to the establishment of the Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin) 
which focused on gathering intelligence on domestic matters.111 
Suharto felt that Pancasila was the sole answer to unify Indonesia.  
Pancasila allowed Suharto to portray his governmental apparatus as a “system 
with the forms of political competition and participation, (and) people would feel a 
sense of engagement with the developmental mission of the state.”112  He felt the 
country needed to get past the severe ideological divides of the past.  In his 
quest to maintain power, he above all else sought to promote stability.  At the 
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heart of his political system was the military, which actively participated in 
Suharto’s GOLKAR party.  To appease Indonesians and appear supportive of 
democracy, Suharto allowed for other parties, but they were ineffective.  Suharto 
allowed for three parties: Golkar; PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), which was 
a combination of Christian, socialist and nationalist parties; and PPP (United 
Development Party), which was a forced mixture of conflicting Muslim groups.  
PPP was an obvious attempt to blunt NU’s influence by combining it with its rival 
Muhammadiyah. (the two groups demonstrated their differences previously with 
NU leaving Masyumi)  Suharto had created a system where Golkar remained 
unchallenged due to the other parties’ severe internal divisions.113  All members 
of the government were required to join Golkar, which made politicking by the 
other two parties difficult.  PPP and PDI had no chance for political gain, and, as 
a result, Golkar would go on to “win” the next six elections.114 
As much as Suharto pushed Pancasila, he also pushed his 
developmentalist strategy.  This strategy was seen as immensely successful by 
the citizenry, at least until the economic collapse in 1997.  Suharto had faced the 
same grim economic picture as Sukarno had, but Suharto succeeded in leading 
the economy out of the doldrums.  Suharto took the 600 percent inflation in 1965 
and turned the economy around.115  He developed infrastructure and 
encouraged foreign investment. 
Pancasila during the first half of Suharto rule allowed him to remain fairly 
insulated from criticism.  After all, he claimed that every decision was done for 
the good of the state.  NU during this time went along with the president, and this 
actually had the effect of turning away some of its key support.  Suharto and his 
strategy against Islamic groups can not be solely blamed for the weakening of 
their influence.  Part of Islam’s lessoning role had to do with Muslim strategy.  
One direct result can be seen in the religious conversion numbers of the late 
1960’s.  NU continued to take a hard line against former PKI members and 
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forbade them from becoming NU members.  NU also actively criticized the 
government for even releasing PKI prisoners.  This aggressive stance proved 
offensive to many Indonesian Muslims.  Christian groups took advantage through 
proselytizing and steadily increased membership.  Islam lost substantial numbers 
to Christianity, including 3 percent of the Java population and 1.5 percent of the 
entire Indonesian population.116  Suharto understood, just as his predecessor 
had, that the radical Islamist position was far from becoming mainstream. 
3. Radical NU Pushes Islamism 
To better understand the state/NU relationship it would be helpful to 
expand on a few key points presented in the previous chapter and focus on the 
Islamist perspective with regard to state policy.  Sukarno’s policies by the 1960’s 
had the effect of increasingly offending NU. Many in NU saw Sukarno as often 
pursuing anti-Islamic policies.  A split developed between the old guard and the 
new.  Senior NU leadership continued a policy of accommodation toward 
Sukarno policies. This strategy was seen as outdated and ineffective by an 
increasing number in the radical wing of NU.  Groups such as the youth wing of 
NU, Ansor, and NU veteran’s associations became increasingly active.  The 
heart of the consternation with Sukarno’s policies for NU and especially its 
radical element was the president’s allegiance with the Communists. 
Prior to the eruption of widespread violence in 1965, Sukarno policy had 
driven the radical factions of NU to lean toward violent political solutions.  They 
were also at odds and operating autonomously from the senior leadership.  The 
old-guard chairman of NU at the time, Wahab Chasbullah, still sought a policy of 
accommodation with Sukarno and PKI, but the land reform movement had 
increased organizational tensions, and the ideological split in NU began to overtly 
show itself.  PKI and youth and veteran’s sects of NU openly engaged in 
violence.  By the time the chaotic “Thirtieth of September” events occurred, 
radical NU members had assisted in causing an unstable social environment that 
would make the Communist massacre possible. 
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The eventual failure of Sukarno’s strategy with regard to the Islamists and 
NU was never a foregone conclusion.  In fact, Sukarno received mixed signals 
from the organization.  The elder, more moderate, leadership favored peaceful 
resolutions with Sukarno as president.  The youth wing, on the other hand, 
wanted immediate and drastic change.  For instance, there was much debate 
about the nature of the involvement by senior NU leadership in decisions leading 
to the massacre.  Then NU Chairman Wahab apparently did not have much 
control, though he was often advised and sometimes asked for approval of 
operations.117  But there is ample evidence that at least substantial portions of 
NU were involved.  NU’s daily newspaper, Duta Masyarakat, backed an 
“annihilation” of PKI party members and any who participated in the “Thirtieth of 
September Movement.”118 
As the confusion and chaos in Indonesia reached its peak in 1965 and 
early 1966, NU as a cohesive organization found itself unsettled.  Coordinated 
leadership decisions were lacking within NU.  Young NU radicals were no doubt 
eager for aggressive tactics and the senior leadership appeared to remain quiet 
during these turbulent times.  By the third of October NU’s youth wing, Ansor, 
was calling for its members to assist the army in restoring order.  A relative 
unknown, thirty-four year old fourth vice chairman of NU by the name of Subchan 
partnered with Catholic party leaders in calling for a ban on PKI (at least Muslims 
and Catholics can agree on something).  By 4 October, Subchan released an 
official statement, prepared by young activists, condemning PKI.  Subchan 
should not have had the authority to release such a statement, but the current 
environment favored the radical movement.  Senior leaders did not even see the 
message until the following day.  But senior leadership, faced with growing 
support for the radicals, felt obliged to sign off on the statement.119 
Suharto and his fervent anti-Communist stance increasingly appealed to 
the Islamists.  As Suharto moved into power, debate continued between the 
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radicals and the moderates of NU over political strategy.  But during the early 
stages following the “coup,” NU youth continued to drive organizational policy.  
Six months later they pressed for Sukarno’s official removal, in direct 
contradiction to several senior leaders. (Sukarno, by this time had little real 
authority)  By 1968, the political climate in Indonesia forced even the NU senior 
leadership into relenting and supporting the removal of Sukarno.  The future 
direction of Indonesia was clear. 
4. Suharto Counters Islamism 
It was not long before Suharto demonstrated, much like Sukarno, that 
seriously addressing the Islamist view would definitely not be a policy priority, 
and, in fact, not even necessary.  NU greatly misread the Indonesian political 
situation.  Part of the rationale in backing the army against Sukarno was the 
belief that General Nasution, a moderate pious Muslim, would emerge as the 
army leader.  Whether coincidence or not, Nasution was one of the generals the 
“coup” plotters attempted to kidnap.  Nasution was not in a position to assert his 
authority, and Suharto emerged as the general capable of uniting the army and 
seizing power.  Suharto had actually previously in his career been relieved from 
command by Nasution.  They were not close friends.  This misjudgment by NU 
had lasting consequences.   NU had hoped to ally with Nasution, a man it felt 
would be receptive to Islamic concerns, but instead found it had placed its 
fortunes with the “secular modernizer” Suharto.120   Mostly out of political 
necessity, many in NU initially still chose to support Suharto. 
NU did achieve some early political gains following the events of 1965.  In 
effect, the army and NU were the only relevant political organizations remaining.  
Masyumi had not been a factor since its banishment from politics in 1960.  
Sukarno’s party, PNI, was discredited and severely weakened, and PKI had been 
effectively annihilated.121  The strategy by the radical NU element to support the 
army appeared to be succeeding, but its expectations for future gains were too 
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high.  Initial progress had led NU “to expect more reward from Sukarno’s 
successor than it received.”122 
Suharto showed his desire to de-emphasize Islam early in his tenure.  NU 
continued to support and accommodate Suharto.  In 1968 NU even agreed to the 
controversial decision to reduce Islamic parliament seats from 48% to 28%.  
Suharto at this stage attempted to present an image of Islamic accommodation 
and had assured NU that the interests of Islam would still be met.  He stated that 
“the kiai (religious leaders) are not the only ones to know what is haram 
(forbidden in Islam) and what is not.”123  Suharto could not completely ignore NU, 
but he was politically masterful in consolidating his authority without needing to 
give in to Islamist desires.  He gave just enough to appease, but not enough that 
his authority would be threatened. 
By 1971, Suharto had solidified his hold on power and was able to 
become more aggressive in his pursuit of power.  He began to use intimidation to 
gain electoral support.124  As a result of intimidation tactics, even some ulama 
switched parties and joined GOLKAR.  The government’s party steadily 
increased in size.  Suharto specifically targeted NU as a political threat and 
removed NU from its seat as head of religious affairs.  In 1971 GOLKAR crushed 
NU in the election by a margin of 62 percent to 18 percent.125  These results and 
those of other Muslim parties represented a decline in Muslim party vote from 40 
percent in the 1955 elections to 25 percent in 1971 elections.126  Suharto was 
becoming so powerful that his way was fast becoming the only way in Indonesia. 
Suharto still needed to at least superficially address Islamic concerns.  
Following the elections, Suharto continued a campaign of defusing Muslim 
tensions.  The government catered to Muslims in the interest of social calm by 
siding with Islamic groups with regard to family law, interfaith competition, and 
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religious education.  In 1973 the army amended the marriage law to make it more 
in line with orthodox Islamic practice.  In 1979 the army did not recognize certain 
syncretic Javanist religions as legitimate creeds.  It also banned an annual 
Christian festival of charity and prevented a hosting of world assembly of 
Christians.127  Suharto and the army hoped these actions would show his 
government as supportive of Islam, but he was, of course, only granting 
superficial influence to Muslims.  He still controlled all the real political power, 
and this fact continued to trouble NU. 
Most of Suharto’s political decisions stifled Muslim influence.  NU soon 
found that Suharto was de-Islamizing Indonesian politics.128  Both came to 
distrust one another.  Suharto and his New Order regime worried “that Muslim 
groups (would) use their faith to break up the state (while) Muslim groups 
fear(ed) that the state (would) be used to break up their faith.”129  For Suharto, 
Pancasila was the state.  Muslims, including NU, believed Suharto placed an 
overemphasis on Pancasila, and this policy was often viewed as offensive to 
Islam. 
As Suharto became firmly entrenched in power and Islam as a political 
force became increasingly irrelevant, he forced NU to re-evaluate its strategy.  
NU was increasingly perceived as unable to look out for the best interests of the 
umat.  NU leadership understood that “the more visible NU’s compromises, the 
less so its conscience, and the more limited its appeal to Indonesian Muslims 
looking for a consistent religious opposition to join.”130   Suharto’s forced 
detachment of Islam from the political arena indirectly benefited NU.  NU no 
longer needed to concentrate on Jakarta and central politics.  Suharto had made 
certain that NU’s efforts were futile.  NU went back to the countryside to 
concentrate on the umat.  By returning to its origins, NU regained it legitimacy, 
both politically and religiously.  NU regained touch with its membership.  
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Ironically, Suharto, by attempting to de-legitimize all other parties save GOLKAR, 
gave the disenfranchised a reason to back NU. The less political NU appeared, 
the more appealing it became to the masses.   
As early as the 1970’s NU ulama such as Abdurrahman Wahid were 
forming a new, radical strategy that would be more effective in countering 
Suharto.  Wahid favored a novel strategy that accepted the compatibility of Islam 
and Pancasila.  It involved an acceptance that official politics was not in the best 
interest of NU members and that embracing Pancasila was the best course of 
action.131  He understood that “ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) uses Pancasila 
to define the political boundaries of permissible political behavior in Indonesia” 
and that it sees Islam as a threat to the unity of the state.132  But Wahid 
understood that Pancasila provided at least a chance for NU to have a political 
voice.  Suharto had based his legitimacy on Pancasila.  If NU could mesh Islam 
and Pancasila, it would have the means to compete with the New Order.  
E. THE STRONG STATE 
By the early 1970’s, Suharto and his Pancasila-based state was firmly 
established.  The state was strong and Pancasila was broadly accepted by 
Indonesians.  Those seeking power needed to embrace Suharto’s interpretation 
of the Indonesian state.  Those seeking reform needed to find a strategy 
compatible with Pancasila.  Although Suharto would still face challenges from the 
military for political power, Suharto increasingly viewed Muslim influence as his 
primary concern, both as a challenge to his authority and as a counterweight to 
military influence.  Suharto and the army had effectively meshed into one unit 
and the government’s official party, GOLKAR, was the only one with actual 
official political influence.  Other political parties or challengers to Suharto were 
impossible in the current interpretation of the Pancasila state.  For NU it needed 
to adopt a strategy that would work against these formidable challenges.  Often 
times, those who feel their beliefs repressed react violently, and without the 
Pancasila ideology, violence may well have been the tactic of Islamists.  But NU 
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provided an interesting counter-tactic.  NU believed that Pancasila, interpreted 
correctly, was not counter to Muslim beliefs.  NU embarked upon a path that 
strengthened the state even further, but allowed it to begin to chip away at the 
power of the president and his interpretation of the state.  The NU leader 
Abdurrahman Wahid explained as much in a 1992 interview: 
So the idea was that in order to resist the government’s 
interpretation of Pancasila as the all-embodying, all-dominating 
ideology, is by developing an alternative view of Pancasila.  And 
that vision could only be developed outside of politics.133  
The Islamist NU embraced Pancasila and the current framework of the 
state wholeheartedly, but sought a new understanding that was more conducive 
to the organization’s religious views.  Suharto’s monopoly on the official 
bureaucratic and political structure meant that pressure for reform needed to 
come from outside the system.  NU’s strategy had the effect of countering the 
very means that Suharto had been using to repress his foes.  Suharto put 
Pancasila beyond reproach.  This fact caused an organizational change in NU, 
but it also gave the group a platform to push for reform.  
The same tools the dictatorial Suharto used to legitimize his state were the 
very ones that both pushed Muslims toward democracy and also eventually led 
to the president’s downfall.  NU succeeded because it became a proponent of 
the state, the basic framework of which had survived since the original Pancasila 
conference in 1945.  Suharto’s, like Sukarno’s, authority had been built on 
Pancasila.  These five pillars formed the basis of a philosophy that made criticism 
of the president possible.  NU, though, was unique among Islamists in its 
embracing of Pancasila early on, but it soon became the most prominent group 
that had the greatest influence on Indonesian democratic reform. 
1. NU De-Islamizes Politics 
NU accepted the state, but not necessarily the state as defined by Suharto 
and his New Order.  Suharto policy had led to frustration within NU.  The 
organization had failed to achieve electoral success and believed that it had 
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strayed from its original intent as a socio-religious organization.  The political 
climate within the Indonesian state led NU to reevaluate its political strategy.  By 
the mid 1970’s NU began moving toward an organizational policy that would 
better support its members by “turning away from party-political activity and 
embracing the non-sectarian state philosophy of Pancasila.”134   It also was 
moving toward a policy that would provide it the best chance of success within 
the Suharto-defined state.  At the 1979 NU Congress, the organization decided 
to accept Pancasila and leave official party politics.  By 1983 NU scholars 
officially made the declaration that Pancasila was acceptable to Islam.  They 
proclaimed that there was no need for an Islamic state.135   In so doing, NU had 
re-defined the cultural makeup.  The largest Islamist organization no longer 
called for the Islamization of politics. 
Whereas in 1965 NU chose the violent path to counter a distasteful 
political situation, in 1984 NU demonstrated that it had learned from the failings 
of the past.   Riots erupted in Tanjung Priok (North Jakarta) among Muslims 
upset with the ongoing perception that Suharto was using Pancasila to replace 
Islam both ideologically and spiritually.  Depending on whose account one 
believes, anywhere from eighteen to hundreds were killed.  NU’s reaction to this 
Islamic violence provided an excellent example of the new NU strategy.  Wahid 
stated that by acting violently against the government, the rioters had besmirched 
the umat.  They had incorrectly demonstrated that “Islam and Pancasila as two 
opposing enemies, in which one must eliminate the other.”136  Wahid believed 
the two were compatible.  Suharto, on the other hand, could not use the riots 
against NU. 
Wahid believed that NU’s political history only weakened NU as an 
organization.  Involvement in politics took focus away from the primary goals of 
looking after the umat through its social, economic, and educational programs.  
Leaders increasingly were corrupted by politics and no longer had the best 
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interest of the community at heart.  The umat was losing faith in its leaders, 
which for a traditionalist organization and its emphasis on its leadership was 
quite troubling.137 
Suharto required all organizations to accept Pancasila as their ideological 
foundation.  At the same time, he was heading off all competition with such 
tactics as forming PPP.  NU felt its political influence increasingly lessoned while 
at the same time its ideals were being compromised.  Suharto had issued stern 
warning regarding the consequences of not embracing Pancasila, leaving no 
doubt that this was one element of the state that was beyond challenge.138   NU 
gradually accepted the situation and developed a strategy.  It would embrace the 
five principles of Pancasila to both protect the values of its organization and to 
criticize the New Order government.  It would also leave official party politics. 
Although the initial impact was to drive more PPP members to join GOLKAR, NU 
was able to operate more successfully outside the restrictive bureaucratic 
structure.139  NU’s decision was a unique one, and one that must have surprised 
many experts on Islamic organizations. 
2. Suharto Attempts a Re-Islamization of Politics 
Suharto had been very careful in defining the state and manipulating the 
various social forces.  His policy of aggressive pursuit of his definition of 
Pancasila was supposed to keep the Islamists at bay, and the strategy worked.  
But as a result of Suharto’s policy, NU re-defined itself.  NU was one of the key 
social players, and Suharto counted on the fact that Muslim organizations wanted 
more Islamization.  Now its largest representative, NU, wanted less political 
Islamization and became a force for governmental reform, a fact that was a direct 
threat to Suharto’s authority but in line with his policy.  Suharto would soon turn 
toward a policy that actively encouraged Islamists. 
During the latter part of the 1980’s, Suharto’s state policy strategy 
changed drastically.  Partially due to his diminishing support among the armed 
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forces, he began a policy of courting Islamists to improve his “Islamic credentials” 
and form support that could counter the military.140  Not surprisingly, this policy 
shift also occurred shortly after NU’s decision to leave party politics.  NU began a 
campaign pushing for democratic reform, a campaign that was much more 
threatening to a dictator like Suharto than Islamization.  Islamization would give 
Suharto the means to quash democratic reform.  Wahid explained that Suharto 
allying with Islamist activists would “reconfessionalise” politics and inevitably pit 
the army against the Islamists.  The army would “clamp down” on the emerging 
Islamization and give the “armed forces an excuse to further restrict all forms of 
independent political activity, Islamic or otherwise.”141  In other words, Suharto 
was not embracing Islamization because he wanted more influence; instead, he 
was allowing Islamization to occur in order to combat his real threat to power: 
democratization.  But democratic forces were already underway as a result of the 
Pancasila policy.  NU began an active campaign to counter Suharto.  Two 
examples provide insight into Suharto-state/NU interaction: NU’s mass rally, or 
Rapat Akbar, on 1 March 1992 and the Suharto association with ICMI (Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslimin Indonesia or Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals), the government-approved Islamic organization founded in 
December 1990. 
Wahid sought to demonstrate that NU and Islam stood for an inclusive 
form of democracy, not an exclusive one.142  By supporting Pancasila and 
leaving official party politics, NU was now free to use the strength of its 40 
million-strong membership to influence politics as a legal, outside-the-system civil 
group.  This policy was nowhere more evident than during the 1992 Rapat Akbar, 
a massive NU rally attended between 150,000 and 200,000 people. (Wahid 
argues that the number was closer to 500,000 and that many were prevented 
from attending by the armed forces)143  The rally was an overt display of 
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Pancasila support by NU and provided a forum to make several statements.  
Firstly, the rally demonstrated that NU was no longer a political organization and, 
therefore, it would be inappropriate for the group to endorse anyone, including 
Suharto, for president.  Secondly, it was an attempt by NU to counter Suharto’s 
ICMI strategy.  Wahid wanted to show to the NU membership that NU’s inclusive 
form of democracy still had massive support and that Suharto and ICMI did not 
represent the majority of Muslims.  And thirdly, NU wanted to demonstrate that 
there was an option to the “rising tide of sectarianism and fundamentalism in 
Indonesia.”144 
NU was betting that Indonesians felt much the same way Wahid did, and 
that Suharto’s policy would lack the societal consensus to be accepted.  Wahid 
hoped that the majority of Muslims believed the way he did that “if forced to make 
a choice between the democratization movement and the Islamic movement, ‘my 
choice is clear, I will leave the Islamic movement.”145  Suharto, of course, was 
counting on most Muslims choosing Islamization over democracy. 
Suharto’s pursued his policy well into the 1990’s and there was no 
guarantee that his Islamist strategy would not succeed.  But through the efforts of 
groups such as NU and its pluralistic interpretation of a state, not to mention the 
economic chaos of 1997, the Suharto state eventually fell to an evolving 
democratic state in 1998.  Pancasila survived, and it survived because Suharto 
had spent the majority of his rule ensuring its acceptance within society.  As the 
Indonesian state moves into its first presidential general elections, there is a 
newfound emphasis on finding a workable democracy within the Pancasila 
system.  Pancasila has obviously not been sufficient to ensure democracy, but it 
does provide an acceptable framework.  Wahid said, “If you want to achieve 
political democracy you need more than Pancasila.”146  He argues that for this to 
happen “there must be a separation of the state and civil domains…basic 
freedoms of expression, association, and movement, (and) a separation of 
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powers within government.”147  The skill with which the new leaders manipulate 
the levers of the state to make this happen will ultimately determine if the 
entrenched Pancasila state can evolve into a truly democratic state. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Indonesian state has had one strong thread of continuity: Pancasila.  
Sukarno invented it and Suharto strengthened it.  The concept has always been 
flexible, and this flexibility has allowed for un-democratic abuses to occur at the 
hands of both presidents.  But Pancasila is also inherently an inclusive 
philosophy and one that can provide for a political voice for the masses.  The 
Pancasila philosophy under Sukarno allowed for the massacre of 500000 
Indonesian Communists to occur, but it also allowed for NU to pursue real 
democratic reform.  The inclusive nature of Pancasila allowed for NU to evolve 
from an Islamist-promoting organization to a democratic-promoting organization. 
 
                                            




In 1947, after more than one hundred years of foreign rule, the native 
Algerian and Berber population sensed the grip of French colonialism loosening.  
The Algerian Organic Statute of that year established the first elected assembly 
in Algeria’s history.  Soon, with the success of Nasser’s nationalist revolution in 
Egypt and French withdrawal from Indo-China, Tunisia and Morocco, this first 
taste of national autonomy had blossomed into a popular independence 
movement, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN).  Indicative of its times, this 
first Algerian Rebellion eschewed religious or ethnic frames in favor of socialist 
and nationalist rhetoric.  After six years, 500,000 casualties and the demise of a 
French Republic, the Algerian nationalists had their independence. 
Algeria’s first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, took his regime on a brief, 
autocratic digression to the cult of personality.  In 1965, his tenure was cut short 
by a bloodless military coup.  The coup leader and long-time FLN stalwart, Houri 
Boumedienne, commanded the most significant elements of the Algerian armed 
forces.  As Boumedienne proceeded to consolidate his regime, Algeria finally 
began to reap the benefit of its vast natural resources.  Gradually, the army 
supplanted the FLN as the nation’s dominant political force.  Boumedienne 
gathered his closest civilian associates and the chief military commanders in a 
Council of the Revolution.  Collegial rule was in and factionalism was out.  
Nonetheless, with Boumedienne holding the offices of prime minister, president 
and minister of defense, Algeria remained decidedly autocratic. 
The FLN, though ardently nationalist, represented a larger coalition of anti-
colonial interests.  Chief amongst these was the al Qiyam Society.  This 
transnational Islamic organization reflected the Janus-like perspectives of its 
chief modern day spokesmen:  Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj.148 
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Madani, an articulate devotee of Abduh and Iqbal, was a political activist in 
the early 1950s and was arrested 17 days after Algeria's war for independence 
broke out in 1954. He was released in 1962 and called for democratic elections 
and pluralism.149  Nonetheless, he found that his preference for Islamic 
Fundamentalism was out of favor in the new government. By 1966, Madani was 
in such ill favor with the FLN that he quit formal politics and chose an academic 
career.  He eventually became a professor at Algiers University and later earned 
his doctorate in Britain. In 1982, Madani became a political figure once again 
when he intervened at the expense of established Islamist groups at the 
university in a controversy over the replacement of French by Arabic. 
Consequently, he was jailed for four years. In October 1988, Madani led a 
disciplined rank of Islamists to march despite army gun-fire. The army was called 
to reestablish law and order in Algiers after it was taken over by the mob. Within 
a year, Algeria became the first North African country to legalize an Islamic 
party.150 
Madani’s alter-ego, Ali Belhaj, acted equally as loyal Lieutenant and 
advocate for the more provocative philosophies of Qutb and Mawdudi.  Born in 
Tunisia, Belhaj was a war orphan who received only an Arab-Islamic religious 
education.  His more dogmatic approach included the call for the immediate 
embrace of Sharia and denunciation of the West.  Belhaj found himself 
imprisoned from 1982 to 1987 as a result of his more confrontational Islamist 
style.  However, this only increased his popularity amongst Algeria’s youth.151 
Despite a thin veil of Islam (including a constitutional reference to Islam as 
the state religion), Boumedienne embraced a program of socialist state building.  
The emigrating settlers left behind vast landholdings that the state swiftly 
nationalized.  This policy soon extended to industry with a focus on developing 
the nation’s petroleum sector.  By 1971, Boumedienne managed to nationalize 
the formerly French-controlled oil fields.  This critical achievement coincided with 
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a redistribution of state land to peasant collective farms.  While national petro-
wealth grew, farm productivity did not.  In addition, Boumedienne attempted to 
engage the power of nationalism by promoting Arabic culture and language.  This 
well-intentioned attempt to eradicate the vestiges of French colonialism produced 
the unintended consequence of alienating the large native Berber population.152  
The Berbers had grown accustomed to the uniform subjugation of Berber and 
Arab culture to the Francophone colonial culture.  The official state promotion of 
Arabic promised to deny the Berbers the full rewards of independence. 
By 1976, despite these challenges, Algeria appeared to have struck out on 
a successful path to national consolidation.  Soaring oil prices filled the national 
coffers.  A national charter and constitution were adopted and Boumedienne was 
legally elected president.  Even Boumedienne’s sudden death due to illness 
passed quietly as the army selected Chadli Bendjedid to be Algeria’s next 
president.  After a brief period of consolidation, Bendjedid moved to put his 
personal stamp on national rule.  As part of his policy to ease some of 
Boumedienne’s strict political controls, Bendjedid pardoned former president Ben 
Bella and released him from house arrest.  Bendjedid also moved to liberalize the 
national economy.  These reforms extended to privatizing the unsuccessful 
peasant cooperative farms.  By 1984, Bendjedid had been reelected in an 
unopposed national ballot. 
Algeria’s period of measured national consolidation was drawing to a 
close.  Soaring oil prices had engendered a national population explosion.  The 
youth, in particular, flocked to the cities to benefit from the oil-driven rentier social 
contract:  free education, free health care and government jobs.  As oil prices 
plummeted in the mid-1980s the state’s capacity to maintain this social contract 
evaporated.  By late 1988, young protestors were clashing with police and 
soldiers throughout the country.  Bendjedid followed a program of severe 
repression with political and economic reforms.  He was reelected to a third term 
in December of 1988.  Falsely buoyed by this hollow mandate, Bendjedid revised 
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the constitution in February 1989 in order to lay the groundwork for a July 
legalization of multiparty national elections.  One of the first parties to organize 
under the new system was an Islamist coalition, the Front Islamique du Salut 
(FIS). 
Early in 1990, the FIS handily outpolled the FLN in provincial and 
municipal elections.  The broad public response prompted the Bendjedid regime 
to suspend the June 1991 parliamentary elections and arrest the FIS’s leadership 
– Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj.  When elections resumed in January of 1992, 
the first round of balloting indicated another overwhelming FIS victory.  Famously 
fearing “one man, one vote, one time”, the civilian and military elites behind 
Bendjedid convinced him to resign.  In the ensuing confusion, elections were 
cancelled, parliament suspended and a national High Council of State (HCS) was 
established with formerly exiled FLN war hero, Mohammed Boudiaf at its head.  
As popular unrest cascaded into violence.  The HCS outlawed the FIS and 
unleashed the state’s security apparatus.  By July of 1992, Boudiaf had been 
assassinated and the HCS appointed one of its own, Ali Kafi, to the presidency.  
Although unable to participate politically, the FIS swiftly formed an armed wing, 
the Armee Islamique du Salut (AIS).  Conventional clashes with government 
troops continued through 1993 when the extremist Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) 
emerged as the force behind a campaign of assassinations and bombings.  In a 
single generation, Algeria had slipped from the optimistic exuberance of 
independence to the despairing horror of civil war.  The party of nationalism, 
social justice and hope found itself in a mortal struggle with violent 
Fundamentalists.  How?  Having reviewed the historical context, we will turn to 
an analysis of our five variables.  
B. CIVIL WAR 
This period of Algerian rebellion appeared to begin with a bloodless coup.  
In 1992, the Algerian military nullified national elections which broadly favored 
Islamists, instituted martial law, excused the president and outlawed all Islamist 
political parties.  Access for Algeria’s largest Islamist social movement, led by 
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FIS, had been foreclosed.  Not surprisingly, the origins of this conflict could be 
traced back several years. 
1. Access 
The early stages of Algeria’s Fundamentalist movement were marked by 
the exclusionary rule of a single, military-dominated party.  The regimes 
tolerance of political opposition was testified to by its burgeoning population of 
political prisoners.  However, these circumstances changed under the growing 
weight of demographic and economic strain. 
Algeria’s socialist economy took responsibility for housing, education, 
social services and most employment.  As with many other rentier states, this 
largesse was supported by oil revenues.  In Algeria’s case, oil accounted for 
nearly 90 percent of her exports.  Oil revenues collapsed in the mid 1980s and so 
did the Algerian economy.  Austerity measures fell on the shoulders of the 
majority of the increasingly youthful and urban citizenry.  In October of 1988, 
bread riots erupted in Algiers.  The rioters were chiefly children and teens.153  
These riots swiftly spread throughout the country. 
In response to the size and scope of unrest, President Bendjedid 
introduced a series of political and economic reforms.  His intent was to dull the 
growing public resentment over the nation’s stalled development.154  These 
reforms were not subtle.  A national referendum endorsed Bendjedid’s plan to 
separate the FLN from “direct management at all levels of the state”.155  Further, 
opposition political parties were legalized at the same time that the FLN was 
denied the privilege of selecting candidates and managing elections.  Public 
rallies were officially deregulated and the army withdrew from the FLN central 
committee.  “In only nine months, from October 1988 to July 1989, the Algerian 
political system was fundamentally transformed from a single-party authoritarian 
state to a multiparty, pluralistic nation of laws.”156 
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Islamists seized this unprecedented opportunity.  In March of 1989, a 
broad coalition of Fundamentalists formed the FIS.  Those not willing to join 
formed their own party including Harakat al-Mujtama al-Islami (HAMAS) and 
Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique (MNI).  The political discourse of these 
groups was lively and pluralistic.157  However, Bendjedid’s opening also 
engendered groups with much more radical orientations like the Takfir wal Hijra 
and the Jamaat al-Sunna wa al-Sharia.  These groups existed in the political 
margins.  Nonetheless, the opportunity to organize and mobilize was not lost on 
these groups, or on the watchful army. 
2. Framing 
While FIS emerged from a populist movement responsible for numerous 
strikes, rallies and demonstrations, it became a political party that was eager to 
work within the system.  Taking advantage of the chief mobilizing structure to 
hand, the mosque, FIS espoused a combined message of moderation and 
radicalism.  Abassi Madani represented the former position while Ali Belhaj 
espoused the latter.  This ‘good cop / bad cop’ approach permitted FIS a broad 
array of framing choices. 
Madani’s moderate approach included public reassurance of FIS’s benign 
intentions.  In the party’s 1989 platform, Madani claimed to pursue popular 
support through “persuasion not subjugation.”158  To do so, FIS intended to 
concentrate on the Islamic tradition of al-shura or consultation.  Madani argued 
that “it is the people that rule and no government should exist without the will of 
the people; Islamists are not enemies of democracy.”  Further, he claimed that 
“al-shura permits multiple parties and opposition because the latter is necessary 
and existed during the time of the rightly guided caliphs.”159 By dong so, Madani 
adeptly bridged the gulf between democracy and theocracy.  More specifically, 
by espousing the consistency of al-shura and democracy, Madani effectively 
highlighted the lack of legitimacy in Algeria’s ruling party while bolstering FIS’s 
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claim to power.  The ‘good cop’ established a frame of moderation and political 
legitimacy aimed at broadening the support for FIS as a legitimate, populist 
opposition. 
By contrast, Belhaj embodied the Islamists contempt for secular, ‘western’, 
democratic states.  He insisted that any victory achieved through electoral 
processes was a victory for Islam and not for democracy.  Such hot-headed 
rhetoric managed to condemn autocracy and democracy without addressing the 
relationship between al-shura and theocracy.  Belhaj contended that, "when we 
are in power there will be no more elections because God will be ruling."160  This 
‘bad cop’ routine, though likely reflective of Belhaj’s sincere conviction, served a 
larger political purpose.  Traditional, Islamist frames maintained the militant base 
of FIS power.  This effect was demonstrated on three occasions. 
First, FIS held a demonstration of approximately three quarters of a million 
Algerians on April 20th, 1990.  This peaceful demonstration was designed to 
directly counter an FLN organized march in opposition to the politicization of 
Algeria’s mosques.  The FIS effort was so massive and disciplined that the FLN 
cancelled their event. 
Second, FIS successfully organized a national protest against American 
intervention in the 1991 Gulf War.  The Algerian regime, caught between pan-
Arab loyalty and American diplomacy, remained publicly silent.  As a result, FIS 
captured the popular imagination as a force for action, principle and dignity.  
Belhaj announced that “we do not want power… we leave the thrones to you.  
We want jihad, only jihad and to meet Allah.”161 
Third, FIS executed a general strike in June of 1991.  This strike served as 
a response to a new election law which aimed to enhance FLN polling success.  
FIS focused on this action as a treasonous and undemocratic act.  The 
deployment of army forces in the days preceding the strike enhanced the FIS’s 
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claims.162  On those occasions in which the strike failed to stop factory workers, 
shopkeepers or teachers from going to their employment, FIS activists distributed 
tracts on civil disobedience.  In these cases, FIS asserted that political discourse 
had reached a stalemate.  In the absence of a government accommodation, 
Algerians would have to resort to acts of civil disobedience.  Not surprisingly, 
Madani and Belhaj were arrested for conspiring against the state and 
insurrection. 
Such confrontational efforts were not the only aspects of FIS political 
framing.  Each of these examples began as silent and disciplined events.  They 
were planned, announced and executed legally.  They also served to highlight 
the party’s campaign for communal and departmental offices.  After the 
successful round of balloting in June of 1990, Madani publicly guaranteed party 
and individual freedoms within FIS-controlled departments and communes.  If 
Madani and Belhaj represented opposing wings of the FIS membership, then 
during this period Madani’s moderates were in the ascendant. 
During the June strikes, FIS ensured constant contact with the 
government.  Prime Minister Hamrouche agreed to allow FIS to peacefully 
occupy town squares.  Hamrouche’s failure to defuse the confrontation 
precipitated his resignation.  However, his successor, Ahmed Ghozali 
immediately resumed negotiations with FIS.  The result of these negotiations 
included a promise of free parliamentary elections within six months and the 
amendment of the electoral law which had precipitated the strike.  FIS called off 
the national strike.163 
FIS deftly focused its framing at two targets:  populist mobilization and 
state ineptitude.  A focus on al-shurah as consistent with – and perhaps culturally 
more authentic than – democracy attracted moderate Islamists and secular 
citizenry alike.  An assertion and demonstrable track record of self-discipline and 
moderation contrasted with the state’s failure to maintain law and order or honor 
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their own constitution.   Taken together, these successful acts of political framing 
set the FIS aside as a distinct, credible and effective opposition to FLN rule.  The 
state ceded, intentionally or otherwise, political real estate to FIS. 
3. Timing of Repression 
The Algerian military followed up their coup with a drive to suppress 
Islamist opposition.  This suppression campaign commenced after the Islamists 
had three years in which to mobilize and organize.  This span of time was 
sufficient to allow the FIS to choreograph a landslide electoral victory.  Algerian 
Islamists were the only ones in North Africa able to boast of such an 
achievement.  So, they had much to lose when political repression returned in 
1992:  popular legitimacy, political organizational structures and municipal 
offices. 
FIS, the populist movement, was very busy in 1989 consolidating its new-
found legitimacy.  Neighborhood committees were formed under FIS sponsorship 
to manage local mosques, schools, medical and relief aid, as well as manage 
local political organizing.  In fact, FIS went so far as to establish an umbrella 
trade union for teachers, tourism, transportation, and communications workers.  
Each of these organizations drew from and supported Islamic leagues for 
University faculty, youth clubs and orphanages.  In fact, FIS flowed like water into 
any crack or cavern left by the retreating capacity of the secular Algerian state:  
market and farm cooperatives, hospitals and clinics, and local media outlets.  All 
of these institutions provided opportunities for like-minded Islamists to work 
together and represented a substantial investment in constituency building.  As a 
result, FIS could and did draw on hundreds of thousands of supporters on short 
notice.  These supporters translated into political clout as well as material 
assistance in times of need.  Algeria’s Islamists enjoyed numerous opportunities 
to measure the depth and breadth of their movement.  Smaller Islamic groups 
throughout the large nation had an opportunity to shed their sense of isolation 
and take strength in a broader association.  The rate of strikes increased year on 
year from 1989 to 1991.  When repression returned, Islamists had the networks 
and activist structure to resist. 
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Bendjedid’s muted response to the increase in civil disobedience 
precipitated his ouster by the military.  Boudiaf, by contrast, was no impedance to 
military repression.  In addition to outlawing the FIS, the military directly 
threatened the Islamists physical and material survival.  By February of 1992, the 
army had started to fill five political prisons built in the Sahara.  Thousands of 
Islamists rounded up since the coup kept company with the 500 FIS elected 
officials that were already detained.  Government troops were stationed in those 
cities and townships that had voted for FIS on every Friday to prevent after-
prayer disturbances.  By October, the state had reinstituted special courts and 
sentencing for terrorist activities.  In December, the state moved to bulldoze all 
unofficial mosques.  As the new courts gathered momentum in 1993, they 
sentenced nearly 200 Islamists to death.  Although ‘due process’ was 
suspended, Islamists were frequently killed during police searches and 
manhunts.164 
For three decades, Algeria’s Islamists had grown accustomed to life in an 
authoritarian state.  Popular unrest in the face of a long list of state failures led to 
an unprecedented level of political opening in 1989.  The Islamists used their 
brief period of state tolerance for energetic organization and mobilization.  By the 
time the military overtly seized the reigns of national power, the FIS was 
effective, confident and legitimate.  FIS had much to lose.  When state repression 
returned, it was a swift, reactive convulsion of self-preservation on the part of 
Algeria’s established elites. 
4. Targeting of Repression 
After initial efforts failed to produce the desired effect, Algerian state 
repression grew increasingly indiscriminate, brutal and desperate.  In the wake of 
the coup, Islamists were arrested whether they were violent activists or rank-and-
file members.  So many religiously observant Muslims were targeted by security 
forces that men stopped growing beards or wearing traditional garb.165  By 1996, 
Algeria’s 116 political prisons contained nearly 44,000 prisoners even though 
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only half of this population was actually accused of terrorism.166  Further, when 
the military regime dissolved all of the communal and departmental councils that 
the FIS had won, thousands of FIS sympathizers lost their civil service jobs.  With 
nearly 70 per cent unemployment amongst the youth, job loss was serious 
punishment. 
State repression was not limited to imprisonment and economic 
dislocation.  In the rush to reassert state authority over political discourse, the 
state repressed violent outbursts and peaceful demonstrations alike.  A national 
peace march scheduled by FIS for the 14th of February 1994 was canceled when 
the army deployed paratroopers along the planned pathway.  Following Medani 
and Belhaj’s trial for insurrection, their supporters were forbidden to protest the 
twelve year sentences. 
In time, actual political activity was no longer a precursor to repression.  
Any contact with state security might prompt a violent response.  As the police 
found themselves working in an increasingly hostile environment, they took to 
detaining youths at random and venting their frustration upon them.  These 
youths might have their beards shaved or burned off.  In some instances, young 
men were detained for days to endure beatings and humiliations.167  After a 
downturn in charges between 1989 and 1991, Amnesty International reported 
that incidents of torture dramatically increased after 1992.  By 1993, a de facto 
policy of collective punishment had been implemented that allowed the state to 
inflict reprisals upon entire villages.168 
The indiscriminate nature of state repression afforded few opportunities for 
effective Islamist response.  However, the “perverse effects of that strategy 
began to appear from 1993: a number of FIS voters, who had adopted a wait and 
see attitude then, … became, under the impact of repression, sympathizers of or 
participants in violence against the regime.”169  
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5. Outbreak of Violence 
Soon this sympathy turned to participation for many Algerians.  However, 
the state’s security apparatus worked with marked efficiency.  Sustained state 
repression caused the inclusive umbrella organization that was FIS into an 
increasingly decentralized, exclusive network. 
FIS had grown into an effective political umbrella for Islamists for two 
reasons.  First, FIS seized the initiative, forming the first Islamist party upon 
constitutional reform in 1989.  This positioned FIS in the lead of the Islamist 
movement.  Other Islamist parties, standing against the FIS in local elections, 
appeared to be splitting the Islamist movement at a time that clearly called for 
electoral unity.  Second, FIS adopted an inclusive philosophy which invited 
moderate and uncommitted activists.  There was room for sympathizers and 
supporters as well as activists.  Only the highest level of membership required a 
contribution of time or money beyond voting.170  In addition, FIS welcomed 
leadership from a broad array of Islamist perspectives.  As exemplified by 
Madani and Belhaj, members with starkly different ideologies and agendas could 
find a lowest common denominator in the broader aims and political tactics of the 
organization. 
This changed as indiscriminate government repression continued to 
increase the cost of identification – at any level – with Islamist political parties.  
Political and tactical divisions formed within the opposition.  FIS activists began 
to defect from the moderate umbrella organization in favor of more radical 
organizations that rejected electoral participation generally and democracy 
specifically.171  In September of 1992, representatives of several armed factions 
of the Islamist movement met to unify their efforts behind a single leader.  
However, state security forces raided the meeting, killing or capturing several 
participants.  Aside from breaking up the conference, this raid led to rumors of 
infiltration by state agents.  Such rumors put an end to any talk of unification.172 
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By early 1993, the increasingly fragmented Islamist movement had been 
forced underground.  From this deeply divided context emerged a more diffuse 
and exclusive movement, the Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA).  Made up of a 
combination of urban youth and jihadi veterans of the Afghan War, the GIA 
adopted a program of Quran, Sunna and Salafiya tradition; nothing more and 
nothing less.173  This meant a rejection of democracy, negotiation and secular 
rule of any kind.  More significantly, the GIA program required Muslims of other 
traditions to renounce their earlier beliefs and adhere to the Salafiya tradition as 
a prerequisite to membership.  Though initially loyal to the public image of FIS, 
the GIA eventually repudiated this moderate organization.  Increasingly, these 
militants defined “us” and “them” in very narrow terms.174  Eventually, the GIA 
added other Islamists (including civilians) to their list of Takfir.  With the state on 
one side and the GIA on the other, Algeria’s remaining Islamist movements fell 
prey to random, brutal violence.  Tens of thousands of innocent civilians were 
caught in this crossfire. 
Ultimately, the logic of exclusive organization led GIA to turn against its 
own.  By July of 1995, the GIA had undertaken an orgy of cell on cell fratricide.  
“Thus, as the insurgency developed, the armed movement became even more 
exclusive and decentralized.”175  This process accelerated as militant splinters, 
like GIA, appeared to compete with the ferocity of their anti-system frames as 
ruthlessly as with their guns, knives and bombs.  Rhetoric evolved from a focus 
on exclusivity to a justification for massacre.  The concept of Takfir initially 
defined those who did not rise to earn membership in the GIA.  Soon, the 
concept was used to identify those who could righteously be killed.  This 
perverse ‘just war doctrine’ justified anti-civilian violence as a holy calling and 
sacred obligation.176  By definition, anyone not engaged in this holy war was 
obstructing the holy war.  One was either with the militants or against the 
militants.  In either case, the blood flowed. 
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After three decades of political exclusion and during a period of justifiable 
public unrest, the Algerian government opened the political system to a loyal 
opposition.  At the first indication that this opposition might gain real political 
power, the state attempted to change the rules of the game.  The ensuing riots 
crumbled the civilian façade of Algeria’s autocratic regime.  As the military 
formally claimed the levers of governance, they instituted a reactive and 
increasingly arbitrary repression of political opposition.  In desperation, the army 
abrogated the constitutional boundaries of the state it was attempting to 
preserve.  Imprisoning and killing relatively moderate Islamists led the surviving 
regime opponents to form ever more exclusive groups which precipitated ruthless 
anti-civilian violence.  The Algerian state engendered, fostered and then attacked 
a contentious Islamist opposition; an opposition which constituted the majority of 
its own citizens.  These discrete policy initiatives have come at the cost of the 
rule-of-law, civil society and hundreds of thousands of lives.  A more expensive 
and less efficient national policy could hardly have been imagined; especially one 
which, in hindsight, was elective. 
2. Epilogue 
In January 1994, the HCS selected Liamine Zeroual as Algeria’s next 
president and then promptly dissolved itself.  Zeroual, another veteran of the War 
of Independence exercised wide powers to negotiate with the FIS and other 
insurgents.  In search of a popular mandate, he called for early elections under 
the supervision of the Arab League and the UN.  The 1995 general election 
witnessed a 75 percent voter participation and certification by observers.  
Zeroual’s 61 percent of the popular vote did much to bolster domestic and 
international legitimacy.  Multinationals returned to Algeria’s petroleum industry 
as international lenders rescheduled the nation’s foreign debt.  Another new 
constitution, ratified in 1996, liberalized political participation and established a 
bicameral legislature.  However, allegations of fraudulent parliamentary elections 
in 1997 sparked a renewed round of protests in Algiers.  Zeroual stepped aside 
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in 1998, calling for early national elections.  Amid allegations of fraud, six of 
seven candidates for the presidency withdrew.  The remaining candidate, 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was widely perceived as the front man for the military 
establishment.  Despite his unopposed victory, Bouteflika worked tirelessly 
towards national reconciliation.  His Civil Concord initiative received wide 
endorsement in a national referendum.  An offer of amnesty for militant Islamists 
encouraged many of them to lay down their arms.  Eventually, the AIS voluntarily 
disbanded.  The GIA, however, remained active.  By 1999, the Islamist uprising 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. THE ANALYSIS 
America’s recent experience with international terrorism has revealed a 
complex of misunderstanding and false assumption.  If we are to wage war 
against global terrorism, we must understand our adversary.  This adversary is, 
in part, a zealous, fundamentalist cadre of murderers.  But, this is just the ‘tip of 
the iceberg’.  The larger movement of political Islam is the mass below the 
waterline.  Our public policy discourse has failed to demonstrate an ability to 
analyze this movement in a useful way.  This thesis has provided an example of 
what such analysis might look like. 
Two dissimilar case studies have been exposed to substantially differing 
analytical approaches:  one broad and strategic, the other narrow and tactical.  
Yet, dramatically similar insights have emerged from each analysis.  These 
include:  Islamism is a political ideology, states dictate the terms of national 
political discourse and rules matter. 
1. Politics as Usual 
Indonesian and Algerian Islamists responded to political calculations as 
any other constituency would.  In each case, NU and FIS embraced the political 
opportunities available to them which held the greatest promise for achieving 
their political objectives.  The rhetorical frames employed may have had a 
distinctly Islamic flavor, but the underlying demands were ecumenical.  Calls for 
Islam or al-shurah were calls for a voice in the larger national debate.  These 
movements were demanding that their governments be responsive to the needs 
of the governed.  In turn, NU and FIS succeeded only to the extent that they 
addressed the demands of their own constituencies.  Political participation tests 
these organizations in the same way it tests states.  At the ballot box, 
responsiveness is rewarded while neglect is punished.  When Islamist 
organizations move away from political participation, one can safely suspect a 
failure of access to the electoral process.  The incentives of electoral politics 
transcend race or creed. 
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2. States Matter 
The political landscape of a nation is most affected by the state itself.  In 
each case study, the state dictated the form and substance of political debate.  
This can be done in several ways.  States can seize or cede political real estate 
through issue framing or electoral access.  They can change the cost/benefit 
structure of political participation.  They can engage their constituencies 
proactively or reactively.  Regardless of the tact, states have the power and 
responsibility to shape their political environment.  Violent rebellion, Islamist or 
otherwise, emerges in an environment of the state’s creation.  Therefore, such 
rebellion is evidence of flawed policy making or policy execution.  States are not 
innocent victims, they matter. 
3. Respect the Rules 
Just as states dictate their political environments, they dictate the rules of 
the political game.  These rules, chiefly in the form of constitutions and laws, are 
powerful tools for setting boundaries.  Perhaps more importantly, these rules 
serve to imbue political processes with legitimacy.  Despite the many challenges 
attendant to managing the sprawling Indonesian state, the state consistently 
emphasized their respect for the Pancasila.  As a result, the NU and others found 
that they could rely on this point of national consensus to preserve their 
constituents’ interests.  By contrast, the Algerian state repeatedly undermined the 
authority of the national constitution by manipulating or suspending it to serve 
their political convenience.  Political opposition should not be expected to honor 
rules that the state itself disregards. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
These three insights emerge from an analysis of two Muslim states.  
However, they suggest strong analogies to our own foreign policy debate.  First, 
since Islamists are politicians we should treat them as such.  Providing a forum to 
air grievances does not obligate us to act or ameliorate such grievances.  But, it 
can serve two other purposes:  providing an acceptable outlet for political 
disagreements and informing U.S. policy development.  A meeting between 
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American policy makers and spokesmen for Islamist movements – perhaps the 
Arab League – could advance this initiative. 
Second, since states matter our state must maintain a constant political 
presence in the international community.  The American tendency to intervene 
and then withdraw (e.g. Afghanistan in the 1980s, West Africa in the 1990s) 
shapes the political environment of these regions by our inaction.  Since we will 
inevitably effect this change, we should do it on our own terms.  Therefore, 
American foreign policy makers should institute a formal process for the 
development and maintenance of such policies.  The Senate might insist on the 
diplomatic equivalent of an environmental impact statement from the Executive 
Branch.  Such a requirement demands a thorough plan which incorporates an 
estimate of long-term regional and international consequences. 
Third, since rules matter, America should redouble her effort to conduct 
foreign policy in concert with the values which underlie our own Constitution.  
National Security is not necessarily inconsistent with national values.  The U.S. 
military withdrawal from the Philippines was attacked at the time on national 
security grounds.  However, respecting the will of the Philippine people has led to 
the return of American military and commercial interests on Philippine terms and 
under more favorable economic conditions for America.  To the extent that we 
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